01Facts
In proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the petitioner/accused sought to recall the complainant for further cross-examination under Section 348 BNSS.
pp. 1–3The complainant had been cross-examined, in part, on several dates between 1 June 2023 and 14 October 2025, with adjournments and further opportunities granted to the defence.
pp. 1–3On 12 January 2026, neither the petitioner nor her counsel appeared; the trial court closed further cross-examination.
pp. 1–3The petitioner later sought recall of the complainant, but the trial court dismissed the application.
pp. 1–3She challenged that dismissal before the High Court, arguing that the trial court should have allowed a passover.
pp. 1–302Issues
i.Whether the High Court could use its inherent powers to examine the dismissal of the Section 348 BNSS application despite the bar under Section 438(2) BNSS.
pp. 3–4, 6ii.Whether the circumstances disclosed gross injustice sufficient to justify invoking those inherent powers.
p. 4, 603Law Applied
Section 438(2) BNSS bars revision of interlocutory orders; dismissal of an application under Section 348 BNSS (formerly Section 311 CrPC) is an interlocutory order and is therefore not amenable to revisional scrutiny.
p. 4The High Court’s inherent powers cannot ordinarily be used to circumvent an express statutory bar, though they may be invoked in a case of gross injustice.
p. 4The Court relied on Ram Swaroop Gupta & Ors. v. State NCT of Delhi & Anr., 2026:DHC:514, and Exclusive Capital Limited v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi & Ors., 2026:DHC:6742.
p. 6Provisions in the judgment · 5 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Section 138
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Section 348Section 438
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 251Section 311
04Reasoning
The Court found no gross injustice warranting intervention.
pp. 4–6The defence had cross-examined the complainant at length over multiple hearings, and the trial court had repeatedly granted adjournments and further opportunities.
pp. 4–6On 12 January 2026, neither the petitioner nor a proxy counsel appeared to request a passover, and no satisfactory explanation for the absence was offered.
pp. 4–6A passover or adjournment is a matter of judicial discretion, not a right.
pp. 4–6The Court therefore concluded that the trial court was not required to keep the matter pending in anticipation of a request for a passover.
pp. 4–605Holding
The High Court held that the petition disclosed no gross injustice and dismissed it as devoid of merit and frivolous.
p. 6It imposed costs of ₹10,000, payable online to www.bharatkeveer.gov.in within one week.
p. 6The accompanying applications were disposed of, and a copy of the order was directed to be sent to the trial court.
p. 6Original Court PDF
MonikavsUsha Shrivastava
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