Disciplinary findings that fail the preponderance-of-probabilities test may be set aside as perverse.

The petitioner, a Grade-II Police Constable, was charged departmentally with abetting the suicide of Durga, whose marriage to him had been arranged.

The department’s case relied principally on her father’s account of alleged dowry demands.

Following an enquiry, the petitioner was removed from service; the punishment and subsequent rejection of his mercy petition were affirmed by the authorities

The petitioner challenged those orders, relying, among other matters, on inconsistencies in the evidence and his acquittal in the related criminal case.

The High Court allowed the writ petition and later clarified, at the petitioner’s counsel’s request, that the petitioner had been dismissed—not suspended—and directed the Registry to make the corresponding correction to paragraph 16.

The Court applied the principle that judicial review of disciplinary findings is limited; interference is warranted where a finding is perverse or does not satisfy the test of preponderance of probabilities.

The Court also considered the criminal-court evidence and acquittal as relevant to assessing the sustainability of the departmental finding in this case, without stating that an acquittal automatically nullifies disciplinary proceedings.

No specific statutory provision or precedent is identified in the judgment.

The Court found the departmental conclusion unsustainable because the evidence contained material inconsistencies: the planned pre-wedding rituals on 1 June 2014 sat uneasily with the evidence that Durga was unable to speak after consuming poison; her father did not report the matter to the police until after her death; and, apart from him, there were no witnesses substantiating the charge.

The Court also noted that the department had not adequately considered evidence concerning earlier marriage proposals and that, in the criminal trial, the father said he did not know why Durga had consumed poison, while other family members attributed her distress to a marriage she did not want and her wish to continue her studies.

Taken together, these matters led the Court to hold that the Enquiry Officer’s finding did not withstand the required scrutiny.

It directed the respondents to reinstate the petitioner within eight weeks of receiving the order; the dismissal period was to count for continuity of service, but without monetary benefits.

No costs were ordered.

In the subsequent clarification, the Court recorded that the petitioner had been dismissed, not suspended, and directed the Registry to correct paragraph 16 and issue a fresh copy.