Discretionary Condonation of Long Delay Is Not Interfered With If Exercised to Advance Substantial Justice

The appellants (purchasers) bought two parcels of land in 1975 via a registered sale deed.

In 1981, the Deputy Collector declared the sale void for violating the Gujarat Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, and ordered eviction.

Despite this, the appellants remained in continuous possession for 45 years.

In 2020, the respondents (heirs of the original seller) unsuccessfully applied to the Mamlatdar to implement the 1981 order.

The appellants then filed Revision Applications before the Special Secretary, Revenue Department (SSRD) in 2021/2023 with a 40-year delay.

The SSRD condoned the delay, but the learned Single Judge set aside that order, ruling the delay was unpardonable as the appellants had prior knowledge of the 1981 order through revenue entries and a 2012 partition suit.

1. Whether the heirs of a seller (who pocketed sale consideration) have the locus standi to contest a delay condonation application in a revision filed by the purchaser.

2. Whether the SSRD properly exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in condoning a 40-year delay based on the "cause of justice" and the specific fact of long-term possession.

3. Whether a Writ Court under Article 226/227 can independently re-appreciate evidence to overturn a discretionary order of condonation passed by a lower authority.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, regarding the liberal construction of "sufficient cause" to advance substantial justice.

Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board (2025) and Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India (2023), which establish that an appellate/supervisory court should not interfere with the discretionary exercise of condonation unless it is "wholly untenable, arbitrary, or perverse".

Full Bench decision in Dashratbhai M. Patel v. Maganbhai Joitram regarding the Collector's duty to summarily evict unauthorized occupants under Section 9(3) of the Fragmentation Act, 1947.

The Court reasoned that while the length of delay (40 years) was substantial, the "adequacy and acceptability" of the explanation is what matters in law.

The SSRD’s decision to condone delay was not mechanical; it considered the necessity of deciding the matter on merits given that the appellants had remained in undisturbed possession for over four decades.

The Division Bench found that the learned Single Judge erred by conducting an "independent inquiry" and re-appreciating revenue records to prove the appellants' "knowledge," effectively acting as a Court of Appeal rather than a supervisory Court.

The Bench emphasized that because the original seller’s heirs also stayed silent for 40 years and only moved in 2020 after their mutation plea was rejected, the "status-quo" of the land suggested that perhaps neither party was actively aware of the 1981 order's legal finality.

Thus, the SSRD’s exercise of discretion was not perverse.

The Court held that the SSRD's order dated 18.12.2024 condoning the delay is affirmed, as it was a valid exercise of discretionary power aimed at advancing justice.

Regarding locus, the Court held that since the delay is condoned, the original petitioners (sellers' heirs) shall have the right to participate in the final hearing of the Revision Applications on merits.

The SSRD is directed to decide the revisions independently without being influenced by previous observations.