Grant-in-aid entitlement must be determined by posts’ pre-policy sanction, not merely appointment dates.

GDM College, Harnaut, was established on 26 January 1979 and sought affiliation in the faculties of Arts, Science and Commerce. The State Government granted temporary Intermediate-level affiliation with effect from 9 September 1981. Thereafter, the Managing Committee sanctioned 32 teaching posts and 26 non-teaching posts by Resolution No. 2 dated 26 September 1981. Magadh University accepted and forwarded the proposal for State approval on 26 March 1982.

While the proposal was pending, the State Government introduced the “Vitt Rahit Shiksha” policy through Memo No. 1065 dated 9 December 1982, providing that the financial liability arising from new affiliations and newly sanctioned teaching or non-teaching posts would not be borne by the State Government.

The college was subsequently granted Degree-level affiliation with effect from the academic session 1980–81 and the State Government issued Memo No. 912 dated 24 June 1983 stating that it had no objection to the creation of non-teaching posts.

The petitioner in CWJC No. 1424 of 2025 claimed entitlement as a non-teaching employee appointed as Accountant. The petitioners in CWJC No. 1890 of 2025 were teaching employees appointed on 3 February 1983, 10 October 1985 and 2 July 1998 respectively.

They challenged Memo No. 1580 dated 12 November 2024, which restricted grant-in-aid to employees appointed before 19 October 1982 and only for the period from 9 September 1981 to 19 October 1982.

The petitioners relied upon the earlier judgment in Janardan Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, by which grant-in-aid had been directed in favour of a founder teacher of the same college. That judgment had been affirmed in appeal and subsequent proceedings before the Supreme Court had failed.

Whether Memo No. 1580 dated 12 November 2024 could determine the petitioners’ entitlement to grant-in-aid solely by reference to the dates of their individual appointments.

Whether the teaching and non-teaching posts created by the Managing Committee on 26 September 1981, accepted by Magadh University and forwarded to the State Government on 26 March 1982, had acquired prior to the “Vitt Rahit Shiksha” policy the requisite sanction and status carrying financial liability upon the State Government.

Whether the State Government’s communication dated 24 June 1983, stating that it had no objection to the creation of non-teaching posts, amounted to sanction of those posts with retrospective financial liability.

Whether the final judgment granting relief to Janardan Prasad Singh entitled the present petitioners to identical benefits under Article 14 of the Constitution.

Whether the principle against claiming “negative equality,” as discussed in State of Bihar v. Parvati Kumari, applied to the petitioners’ claims.

The Court applied the distinction between affiliation and grant-in-aid, holding that affiliation does not automatically create a State obligation to finance the institution or its employees.

Under Memo No. 1065 dated 9 December 1982, the “Vitt Rahit Shiksha” policy excluded State financial liability arising from new affiliations and newly sanctioned teaching or non-teaching posts.

The Court held that creation of posts by a Managing Committee, acceptance or forwarding by the University, and actual sanction by the competent authority are legally distinct events; only the requisite statutory and administrative sanction could impose recurring financial liability upon the State.

Article 14 requires equal treatment only of persons similarly situated in both fact and law, and does not permit a person to claim an illegal or unauthorised benefit merely because it was granted to another (“negative equality”).

However, the final judgment in Janardan Prasad Singh could not be reopened as against that individual and had to be examined to determine whether its factual and legal foundation applied to the present petitioners.

The Court also directed consideration of the principle stated in State of Bihar v. Parvati Kumari, concerning the impermissibility of extending benefits granted contrary to Government policy merely on the ground of parity.

The Court held that the State’s approach was legally insufficient because it treated the dates of the petitioners’ appointments as conclusive, without first determining the legal status of the posts against which they were appointed.

Although the petitioners were appointed after the introduction of the “Vitt Rahit” policy, that fact alone did not resolve the matter if the relevant posts had already been validly sanctioned with State financial backing before the policy came into force.

Conversely, the earlier creation of posts by the Managing Committee and their forwarding by the University could not independently establish State liability without competent statutory or administrative sanction.

The communication of “no objection” dated 24 June 1983 could not automatically be treated as retrospective sanction carrying recurring financial liability.

Similarly, the relief granted to Janardan Prasad Singh was final as to him, but did not create an automatic general entitlement for all later appointees; the competent authority had to determine whether the petitioners stood on the same factual and legal footing.

Accordingly, the impugned Memo required reconsideration because it had not examined the cumulative effect of the 1981 resolution, the University’s recommendation, the 1983 communication, the governing policy, and the earlier judgment.

The matter was remitted to the competent authority of the Department of Education for fresh, independent consideration of each petitioner’s claim.

The authority was directed to examine the 1981 Managing Committee resolution, the University’s acceptance and forwarding of the posts, Memo No. 912 dated 24 June 1983, the applicable University provisions, the “Vitt Rahit” policy, the identity and legal status of the posts, the basis of the relief granted to Janardan Prasad Singh, and the applicability of Parvati Kumari.

A reasoned and speaking order was to be passed within three months of receipt or production of the judgment.

If any petitioner was found entitled to grant-in-aid, consequential claims relating to salary arrears, promotion, pensionary and post-retiral benefits were also to be considered in accordance with law.

The Court expressly declined to declare any general or automatic right to grant-in-aid for the petitioners or other employees of the college.