High Court cannot interfere with arbitral interlocutory orders under Article 227 absent patent lack of jurisdiction.

The petitioner initiated arbitration proceedings against Respondent No. 1 (DIAC/10057/12-24) regarding a dispute arising from a Master Service Agreement.

During the proceedings, the petitioner moved an application to implead Respondent Nos. 2, 3, and 4, alleging they acted collectively and had significant obligations under the contract.

On 28.10.2025, the Sole Arbitrator rejected the impleadment application, finding no privity of contract between the petitioner and the proposed respondents.

The petitioner challenged this interlocutory order before the High Court of Delhi under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the High Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to interfere with an interlocutory order passed by an Arbitral Tribunal.

The court relied on the principle of minimal judicial intervention as enshrined in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

It applied the precedent in *S.B.P. & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd.*, which mandates that parties must generally wait for the final award to challenge interim grievances unless a right of appeal exists under Section 37.

The court further applied the criteria from *Surender Kumar Singhal v. Arun Kumar Bhalotia*, approved in *Serosoft Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Dexter Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd.*, stipulating that Article 227 jurisdiction over arbitral tribunals should be exercised "sparingly" and only in "exceptional circumstances" where an order is "completely perverse" or "patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction".

The Court observed that the petitioner was attempting to challenge an interlocutory order regarding party impleadment rather than a final award.

While the petitioner argued that the Tribunal’s finding—that there was no privity of contract—was perverse due to the respondents’ subsidiary status and financial dealings, the Court held that such grievances do not constitute the "exceptional circumstances" required for constitutional interference.

Applying *Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC*, the Court reasoned that the legislative intent of the Act is to discourage intermittent litigation that obstructs the arbitral process.

The Court determined that the petitioner possesses an adequate statutory remedy under Section 34 or Section 37 of the Act to challenge the decision at the appropriate stage after the conclusion of proceedings.

The petition was disposed of, reserving the petitioner's right to raise the plea of impleadment at a later stage under Section 34/37 of the Act, if necessary.