High Courts should ordinarily decline writ petitions alleging police inaction where Magistrate remedies are available.

The petitioner claimed that a civil suit concerning land had been decreed in his favour and that he had obtained possession of the property.

He alleged that respondents 5 to 7 were threatening to dispossess him and, in consequence, submitted complaints to the Station House Officer, Bargi, and the Superintendent of Police, Jabalpur.

The State opposed the petition, submitting that the petitioner’s application dated 11 May 2026 had already been acted upon and that an entry/case under Section 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) had been registered.

It was further contended that the petitioner had an efficacious alternative remedy before the competent Magistrate under Sections 156(3), 200 and 202 CrPC.

Whether the High Court should entertain a petition under Article 226 seeking directions for registration of a criminal case, proper investigation, or police action when the petitioner has efficacious statutory remedies before the police authorities and the Magistrate under the CrPC/BNSS.

Whether the petitioner should be relegated to the remedy of approaching the competent Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC, or the corresponding provision of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”), despite the alleged police inaction.

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution in light of the rule that an alternative efficacious statutory remedy ordinarily restrains the High Court from exercising writ jurisdiction.

Under Section 154(3) CrPC, an aggrieved informant may approach the Superintendent of Police where the police fail to register an FIR; under Section 156(3) CrPC, the Magistrate may direct registration of an FIR, order a proper investigation, and monitor the investigation; and under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC, the complainant may pursue a private criminal complaint.

These principles were reaffirmed in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., (2008) 2 SCC 409, which held that the Magistrate possesses wide supervisory powers and that the High Court should ordinarily discourage writ petitions concerning non-registration or improper investigation.

The Court also relied on Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage, (2016) 6 SCC 277, and M. Subramaniam v. S. Janaki, Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2011, decided on 20 March 2020, which direct aggrieved persons to pursue the remedy under Section 156(3) CrPC rather than directly invoking Article 226.

The Court further referred to Shweta Bhadoriya v. State of M.P., (2017) 1 MPLJ (Cri) 338, and Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437, recognising the statutory remedies under Sections 154(3), 156(3) and 200 CrPC and their corresponding provisions under the BNSS.

The petitioner’s grievance concerned alleged police inaction and threats relating to possession of land, rather than a matter requiring the High Court’s direct intervention under Article 226.

The Court noted that the police had already acted on the petitioner’s application by recording a proceeding under Section 155 CrPC, and that any grievance regarding the adequacy of such action or the need for further investigation could be examined by the competent Magistrate.

Applying Sakiri Vasu and the subsequent decisions, the Court held that the Magistrate’s jurisdiction under Section 156(3) CrPC was sufficiently wide to direct registration of an FIR, order proper investigation, and monitor the investigation.

Since the petitioner had not exhausted this efficacious statutory remedy, the High Court declined to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction.

The petition was accordingly dismissed, with liberty to the petitioner to approach the concerned Magistrate under the applicable provisions of the CrPC/BNSS for redressal of his grievance.