Hindu widow’s limited agricultural-land interest became absolute under 1956 Succession Act, Supreme Court rules

Khajano held the disputed agricultural land and was declared a Bhumidhar under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 (“DLR Act”).

Her interest originated as a limited estate inherited before the DLR Act commenced.

After the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“HSA”) came into force, Khajano died in 1973, leaving two sons from her second marriage.

They sought mutation in their favour; the appellants, claiming as reversioners and descendants of the original male line, sought mutation in their favour instead.

The revenue authorities ordered mutation for Khajano’s sons, and the Delhi High Court Division Bench upheld that outcome.

1. Whether, under Section 51(2)(a) of the DLR Act, the applicable personal law is the law in force when the female Bhumidhar inherited the interest or the law applicable at her death.

2. Whether Section 14(1) of the HSA enlarged Khajano’s limited interest into an absolute interest, so that her holding devolved under Section 53 rather than Section 50 of the DLR Act.

Section 51(2)(a) of the DLR Act governs succession where a Bhumidhar inherited an interest before the Act commenced as a widow, mother, daughter, or other specified female relative.

If, at her death, her personal law entitled her only to a life estate, the holding devolves on the nearest surviving heir of the last male proprietor under Section 50; if her personal law entitled her to the holding absolutely, it devolves under the table in Section 53.

The reference to “personal law” is general and applies the law in force when succession opens.

Under Section 14(1) of the HSA, property possessed by a Hindu female, including property acquired by inheritance, is held by her as full owner, subject to Section 14(2).

Bajaya v. Gopikabai, (1978) 2 SCC 542, supports applying subsequent developments in personal law where a statute refers to personal law generally.

The Court read Section 51(2) as distinguishing between the historical fact that the female Bhumidhar inherited her interest before the DLR Act and the circumstances existing when she died.

The present-tense word “dies” directs the Court to assess, at that point, the nature of her entitlement under the personal law then applicable.

Although Khajano’s interest was initially limited, Section 14(1) of the HSA enlarged it into absolute ownership.

Because she died in 1973, after the HSA came into force, her holding devolved under Section 53 of the DLR Act, not under Section 50 to the heirs of the last male proprietor.

Khajano’s limited interest had become absolute under Section 14(1) of the HSA; accordingly, the holding devolved under Section 53 of the DLR Act.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and made no order as to costs.