Hostile testimony by minor prosecutrix and parents cannot justify quashing prosecution for non-compoundable POCSO offences.

The applicant sought the quashing of FIR Crime No. 268/2024 (P.S. Jabera) and the subsequent trial (Case No. SC/33/2025) involving charges of kidnapping and sexual assault

The prosecution alleged that the applicant took a minor girl (under 15 years) to Ajmer, where he had sexual relations with her, resulting in pregnancy

The applicant contended that the prosecutrix is now a major, they have married and have a child, and that the prosecutrix (PW/1) and her parents (PW/2, PW/3) turned hostile during the trial

While the defense claimed innocence based on consent, the State opposed the petition, highlighting that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the incident, her Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement supported the charges, and the DNA report was positive

The court applied Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (B.N.S.S.), which provides for the High Court's inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of the process of law

The substantive charges were framed under Sections 87 (kidnapping), 137(2) (kidnapping from lawful guardianship), and 64(2)(m) (rape in certain circumstances) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (B.N.S.), alongside Sections 3/4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act

The legal principle established is that the consent of a minor is legally immaterial in such offenses

The court reasoned that inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 B.N.S.S. must be used sparingly and only to prevent injustice

In this instance, the court found that the evidence collected during investigation—particularly the DNA report identifying the applicant as the biological father—prima facie disclosed a cognizable offense

The court rejected the applicant's reliance on the prosecutrix’s hostile testimony, noting that serious and non-compoundable offenses under POCSO and B.N.S. cannot be quashed simply because witnesses turn hostile or the parties settle

It further observed that evaluating the weight of evidence or the "consent" of a minor girl below 15 years would amount to premature adjudication, as these are matters belonging exclusively to the domain of the Trial Court

It held that since the trial is ongoing and material witnesses are yet to be examined, interference by the High Court would be improper

The court clarified that the Trial Court must decide the case on its merits independently of the observations made in this order