Human Rights Commission compensation recommendations require a reasoned finding of negligence after meaningful inquiry.

On 5 September 2020, a transformer at Indraini Nagar, Bhosari, Pune, exploded and spilled oil, causing burn injuries to a five-month-old child and two women; one woman later died.

A public-interest association complained to the Maharashtra State Human Rights Commission (“Commission”), alleging negligence by MSEDCL officials.

After receiving explanations from the officials, the Commission recommended that MSEDCL and the police jointly pay ₹10 lakh each to the victims’ legal heirs.

MSEDCL challenged the Commission’s communication and order by writ petition, contending, among other things, that the finding of negligence was unsupported and the Commission had exceeded its jurisdiction.

1. Whether the Commission’s recommendation for compensation was supported by a reasoned finding, based on an adequate inquiry, that MSEDCL officials were negligent in preventing a human-rights violation.

2. Whether the Commission’s order recommending compensation should be set aside on judicial review.

Under Sections 17 and 18 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, the Commission may inquire into complaints and, where an inquiry discloses a human-rights violation or negligence in preventing or abetting one by a public servant, recommend compensation or damages to the appropriate Government or authority.

Sections 13 and 14 provide the Commission with powers to summon witnesses, require documents and public records, and use investigating officers or agencies; Section 16 provides for an opportunity to the concerned person to present a defence.

The Court referred to a coordinate-bench decision holding that Commission recommendations are not to be ignored with impunity, but remain amenable to judicial review.

It also noted the principles in SPS Rathod v. State of Haryana, (2005) 10 SCC 1, and M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395: compensation for rights violations requires a prima facie or established violation, and writ compensation is generally suited to clear and patent infringements rather than cases involving foundational disputed facts.

The Commission had received the officials’ explanations denying negligence, but rejected them as an “eyewash” principally on the basis that experienced officials ought to have anticipated the incident and that criminal proceedings had been initiated against them.

The order did not explain why the officials’ specific explanations were rejected or identify the material supporting its finding of negligence.

Although the Act empowered the Commission to conduct a fuller inquiry using its statutory powers, it had not undertaken such an inquiry.

Because a recommendation for compensation under Section 18 depends on an inquiry disclosing negligence, the unsupported finding did not satisfy the statutory threshold and could not sustain the recommendation.

It recorded that MSEDCL had paid ₹12 lakh to the deceased’s legal heirs, a fact not disputed by the Commission’s counsel, and clarified that the victims or complainant remained at liberty to seek compensation or damages before the competent civil court; the Court’s observations would not impede such proceedings.