In circumstantial cases, Section 106 Evidence Act cannot substitute the prosecution’s primary burden of proof.

The appellant was accused of murdering his wife, Rejina Munda, with a dao and subsequently setting their dwelling house on fire at approximately 3:00 AM on January 22, 2019.

The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 302 and 436 of the IPC based on circumstantial evidence, including an alleged extrajudicial confession made before villagers, the recovery of the weapon of offense, and the appellant's failure to explain the death of his wife under Section 106 of the Evidence Act.

The appellant challenged this conviction, asserting that the extrajudicial confession was made in the presence of police and that the chain of circumstantial evidence was incomplete.

1. Whether the extrajudicial confession made by the appellant is admissible in evidence under Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act.

2. Whether the prosecution established a complete chain of circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction under the principles of Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra.

3. Whether the burden of proof shifted to the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act regarding facts "especially within his knowledge".

The court applied the "five golden principles" for circumstantial evidence established in Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, requiring a complete chain of evidence excluding every hypothesis of innocence.

It applied Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, which mandates that confessions made in the presence of police officers are inadmissible unless made before a Magistrate.

The court further relied on Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer regarding Section 106 of the Evidence Act, emphasizing that this section does not relieve the prosecution of its primary burden to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.

The High Court found the extrajudicial confessions inadmissible as PW-2, PW-4, PW-5, PW-6, and PW-9 admitted during cross-examination that police personnel were present when the appellant allegedly confessed.

Regarding the weapon of offense, the court noted significant discrepancies in the testimony of witnesses concerning the location of recovery (varying from the roadside to the side of the dead body) and observed that the dao was never sent for forensic examination to link it to the victim’s blood.

A contradiction in the timing of the incident emerged; while some witnesses claimed the fire occurred at 3:00 AM, the informant (PW-2) and others (PW-6, PW-9) testified to seeing the house burning in the evening (7:00 PM to 9:00 PM), which lent plausibility to the appellant's defense that he was away at work during the day.

The court held that since the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie complete chain of circumstances, Section 106 could not be invoked to fill the gaps in the prosecution's case.

The court concluded that an alternative hypothesis of the appellant's innocence remained possible due to conflicting timelines and investigative lapses.

The High Court set aside the judgment dated June 7, 2022, acquitted the appellant of all charges by granting the benefit of doubt, and ordered his immediate release.