Interlocutory orders refusing to summon witnesses cannot be challenged in revision due to the Section 397(2) CrPC bar.

The CBI filed a criminal revisional application challenging orders dated October 28 and 29, 2025, passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Bankura, in Complaint Case No. 36C/2014

In a previous writ petition (WPA 29425/2014), the High Court had issued a peremptory mandate on September 3, 2025, directing the trial court to conclude the proceedings by December 19, 2025, on a day-to-day basis

During the trial, the CBI sought warrants of arrest against non-appearing witnesses under Section 87 CrPC and moved an eleventh-hour application under Section 311 CrPC to summon an additional witness, Bina Ghosh

The CJM rejected these pleas and closed the evidence to meet the High Court's deadline

By the time of this revision, the trial had progressed to the final stage: Section 313 statements were recorded, defense evidence was concluded, and the matter was fixed for judgment on November 27, 2025

The Court applied Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), noting the term "may" grants judicial discretion rather than a mandatory right to issue warrants

Section 311 CrPC, holding that while powers are wide, they cannot be used to fill lacunae caused by long-standing inertia

The Court invoked the statutory bar under Section 397(2) CrPC, which prohibits the exercise of revisional jurisdiction against interlocutory orders passed during an inquiry or trial

The Court reasoned that the sub-ordinate court was under a "solemn obligation" to comply with the High Court’s time-locked constitutional decree, which overrode procedural indulgences

The CBI’s attempt to summon Bina Ghosh was deemed "tainted by laches" because the agency had over a decade to identify the witness but only claimed her relevance at the "eleventh hour"

The Court found that issuing warrants would have necessitated indefinite adjournments, directly defying the superior court's embargo on routine delays

The Court determined that the impugned orders regarding witness summoning were purely intermediate and "interlocutory in nature," as they did not determine the final guilt or innocence of the accused

Allowing the revision at the final stage of the trial would result in "procedural infinite regression"

The Court ruled that the trial court acted correctly in balancing procedural fairness with the mandate for a swift conclusion

All interim orders were vacated, and the Trial Court was directed to pronounce the judgment at its earliest convenience upon receipt of the order