01Facts
The complainant alleged that, although he had resigned as a director of Bharath Infra Exports and Imports Ltd. and was not a guarantor or mortgagor for the company’s borrowings, SBI officials caused his name to be published in a SARFAESI possession notice as a defaulter.
¶ 3–6, 17–18, 21, 24He claimed the publication harmed his reputation and business interests.
¶ 3–6, 17–18, 21, 24The Magistrate recorded statements from the complainant and two witnesses, considered documents, and issued process for offences under Sections 499 and 500 IPC.
¶ 3–6, 17–18, 21, 24SBI and three officials sought to set aside the process and quash the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC.
¶ 3–6, 17–18, 21, 24The complainant disputed the authenticity of guarantee deeds relied on by the petitioners; a civil court had granted an injunction restraining SBI from relying on those deeds while the suit was pending.
¶ 3–6, 17–18, 21, 2402Issues
i.1. Whether the complaint and supporting material disclosed a prima facie case of defamation, notwithstanding the related civil and debt-recovery proceedings and the petitioners’ reliance on alleged guarantee deeds.
¶ 25–30ii.2. Whether the Magistrate’s order was vitiated by non-compliance with Section 202 CrPC, including because accused no. 2 resided outside the Magistrate’s territorial jurisdiction.
¶ 31–36iii.3. Whether Section 32 of the SARFAESI Act or the individual roles alleged against the bank officials warranted quashing of the proceedings.
¶ 33–3903Law Applied
Sections 499 and 500 IPC require an imputation made with the intention, or knowledge, that it would harm a person’s reputation; at the quashing stage, allegations taken at face value must disclose the offence, while statutory exceptions to defamation may require proof at trial.
¶ 28–30Civil and criminal proceedings may coexist where the same conduct gives rise to both causes of action and the complaint discloses the ingredients of an offence.
¶ 26Under Section 482 CrPC, defence documents may justify quashing only where they are of sterling and impeccable quality and conclusively disprove the accusation; disputed documents ordinarily require investigation or trial.
¶ 27Section 202 CrPC requires an inquiry or investigation in the circumstances covered by that provision, but examination of the complainant and witnesses may satisfy the requirement of inquiry into whether sufficient grounds exist to proceed.
¶ 36Section 32 of the SARFAESI Act protects acts or omissions done in good faith.
¶ 33Criminal liability cannot be imposed on an officer merely by virtue of office; the complaint must attribute a specific role or participation to that individual.
¶ 37Provisions in the judgment · 12 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 156Section 200Section 202Section 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 34Section 403Section 406Section 420Section 464Section 499Section 500
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 Section 32
04Reasoning
The Court held that the alleged guarantee deeds could not conclusively defeat the complaint because their authenticity was disputed in the civil suit and their use was subject to an injunction; they therefore were not unimpeachable material suitable for quashing.
¶ 27The allegation that the complainant was knowingly described and publicly identified as a guarantor and defaulter, despite his denial of that status, was sufficient at this stage to disclose a prima facie defamatory imputation.
¶ 28–30The Court considered that the asserted protection under the exceptions to Section 499, including good-faith publication, could not be established on the material before it.
¶ 28–30The Magistrate had recorded the complainant’s and two witnesses’ statements and considered the documents, which satisfied the Court that the order reflected application of mind and that the Section 202 inquiry requirement had been met.
¶ 32, 36Section 32 did not warrant quashing because good faith was disputed.
¶ 34–39As to individual responsibility, the complaint did not allege specific participation by accused no. 2; accused no. 3 was alleged to have informed accused no. 4 that the complainant was not a guarantor and was no longer a director.
¶ 34–39By contrast, accused no. 4 was specifically alleged to have caused the complainant’s inclusion in the publication as a defaulter.
¶ 34–3905Holding
The Court partly allowed Crl.P. No. 1573 of 2019 and quashed the proceedings against accused nos. 2 and 3, finding no sufficient specific allegations against them.
¶ 38–40It declined to quash the proceedings against SBI (accused no. 1) and accused no. 4, holding that the complaint disclosed a prima facie case against them.
¶ 38–40Crl.P. No. 852 of 2019, filed by accused no. 4, was dismissed.
¶ 38–40Original Court PDF
STATE BANK OF INDIAvsMR BHARATH DAYANANDA
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