Karnataka HC Sets Aside Family Partition Decree After Two Defendants Did Not Sign Settlement, Sends Suit Back For Fresh Hearing

In brief

The question

Whether the Trial Court could decree the suit on the basis of a joint memo that the appellants had not signed or specifically consented to

The court held

The Court allowed both appeals, set aside the judgment and decree dated 27 October 2016 in O.S. No. 3909/2010, and remitted the matter to the Trial Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law after hearing the appellants and respondents.

It also directed

The Trial Court was directed to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible, preferably within one year of receiving a certified copy of the order; pending interlocutory applications were disposed of as infructuous.

01Facts

The plaintiffs brought a suit for partition and separate possession.

pp. 8–9

After the defendants appeared and filed a written statement, the plaintiffs and some defendants filed a joint memo recording an amicable settlement.

pp. 8–9

The two appellants—Defendant No. 1 in RFA No. 815/2018 and Defendant No. 2 in RFA No. 204/2017—did not sign the joint memo, nor did their counsel. The Trial Court nevertheless decreed the suit on its basis. The appellants challenged that decree.

pp. 8–9, 11–12

Defendant No. 1 also contended that, during the proceedings, the legal representatives of the third plaintiff had sold the suit property to other respondents

pp. 8–9, 11–12

02Issues

i.Whether the Trial Court could decree the suit on the basis of a joint memo that the appellants had not signed or specifically consented to

pp. 9–11

ii.Whether the decree should be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh consideration, including in light of the alleged subsequent sale of the suit property

pp. 11–13

03Law Applied

Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requires a lawful compromise, including the parties’ voluntary agreement, before a compromise decree may be passed.

pp. 9–11

Relying on *Krishna Kumar Ojha and Others v. Jitendra Chaudhary and Others*, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 652, and the principles quoted there from *Prasanta Kumar Sahoo v. Charulata Sahoo* and *Govindammal v. Marimuthu Maistry*, the Court emphasised that a counsel’s authority to compromise should be supported by express authorisation or the party’s specific consent; absent such consent, the voluntary character required by Rule 3 cannot be established

pp. 9–11

Provisions in the judgment · 1 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 96

04Reasoning

The appellants were parties to the suit but had not signed the joint memo, and the record did not establish their specific consent to the compromise. The Trial Court therefore erred in decreeing the suit on a memo filed by only some parties.

pp. 9–12

Applying Order XXIII Rule 3 and the cited Supreme Court decision, the Court held that the decree could not stand on that basis. The alleged sale during the proceedings further supported remitting the matter for fresh consideration after hearing all concerned parties

pp. 9–12