Leave to appeal against acquittal is unwarranted where trial findings are plausible and non-perverse.

Rajiv Usrathe, a daily-wage employee in the Public Health Engineering Department, was appointed as a Hand Pump Mechanic in 1991.

The prosecution alleged that he lacked the prescribed Higher Secondary qualification and had obtained his appointment on the basis of false documents.

Following investigation, he was tried for offences under Sections 468, 420 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code.

The Sessions Court acquitted him by judgment dated 10 August 2018.

The State sought leave to appeal against that acquittal under Section 378(3)/(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, contending that the trial court had failed to properly assess the evidence.

Whether the State had made out a case for leave to appeal against the respondent’s acquittal for offences under Sections 468, 420 and 471 IPC

Whether the trial court’s assessment of the evidence disclosed perversity, patent illegality or misreading of material evidence warranting appellate interference

Section 378(3)/(4) CrPC governs the seeking of leave to appeal against an acquittal.

The Court relied on Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657, for the principle that where two views are reasonably possible, the view favouring the accused is to be adopted.

An acquittal does not warrant interference where the trial court’s findings are supported by the evidence and do not suffer from manifest illegality, perversity or misreading of material evidence.

The High Court examined the trial court’s findings, including those in paragraph 43 of its judgment, and concluded that the trial court had considered the prosecution evidence and given cogent and plausible reasons for acquittal.

It further found that the prosecution had failed to produce evidence establishing its case and that the trial court’s findings were consistent with the evidence on record.

As no perversity, patent illegality or material misreading was shown, the State had not established grounds for appellate interference or for granting leave.

It dismissed the M.Cr.C. as devoid of merit.