### Liberal interpretation of “sufficient cause” in partition suits to set aside abatement and advance substantial justice.

The applicants (originally Defendants 1–5) filed an application under Order 22 Rule 9 CPC to set aside the abatement of Second Appeal No. 376/2015.

The appeal arose from a partition suit where the first appellate court granted a decree in favor of the plaintiff (original Respondent No. 1).

During the appeal, Respondent No. 1 died on February 28, 2020. The Court was informed on March 2, 2020, but the applicants failed to bring legal representatives (LRs) on record within the 90-day limitation period.

Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal as abated on February 2, 2024.

The applicants contended the delay was due to the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing mediation talks, only discovering the dismissal upon receiving an execution notice in September 2024.

1. Whether the delay in filing the application for setting aside the abatement of the second appeal should be condoned under the "sufficient cause" standard.

2. Whether an appeal in a partition suit can be treated as abated in its entirety if one respondent dies but other family members (co-sharers) remain as parties to the record.

The Court applied Order 22 Rule 9 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act regarding the liberal construction of "sufficient cause" to advance substantial justice.

It relied on Bhagwan Swaroop v. Mool Chand, (1983) 2 SCC 132, which establishes that partition suits occupy a peculiar footing where parties can be transposed and the death of one may not necessarily abate the whole suit if other members are present.

Furthermore, it followed Ram Nath Sao v. Ram Nath Sahu, (2002) 3 SCC 195, and N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, emphasizing that the court should avoid a pedantic or hyper-technical approach to delay when no mala fides are present, though the opposite party should be compensated for laches.

The Court reasoned that in partition suits, the shares are declared via a preliminary decree, and the rights of the parties are substantially decided even before a final decree is passed.

Since Respondent No. 2 (a family member and co-sharer) was already on record in the second appeal, the appeal could not have been entirely abated despite the death of Respondent No. 1.

Regarding the delay, the Court noted that while there was negligence on the part of the applicants, there was no evidence of mala fides or a deliberate dilatory strategy.

Applying the principle of "substantial justice," the Court found that the high stakes involved in property partition outweighed the technical lapse in filing the substitution application, provided the respondents were compensated for the delay.

The abatement of Second Appeal No. 376/2015 was set aside, and the appeal was readmitted to its original number, conditional upon the applicants paying a cost of Rs. 10,000/- to the respondents within four weeks to compensate for the laches.