Madras HC Sets Aside Teen’s POCSO Conviction And 20-Year Sentence After Children’s Court Failed To Decide If Adult Trial Was Needed

In brief

The question

Whether the Children’s Court’s failure to comply with Section 19(1) of the JJ Act vitiated the appellant’s trial and conviction.

The court held

The Court held that non-compliance with Section 19(1) of the JJ Act vitiated the proceedings and set aside the appellant’s conviction and sentence.

It also directed

The appeal was allowed, and any fine paid was ordered to be refunded.

01Facts

The appellant was prosecuted for aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Sections 5(l) and 5(j)(ii), read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

pp. 7–8, paras 15–16

The prosecution alleged that he assaulted the victim, who was about 15 years old, and that she later became pregnant.

pp. 7–8, paras 15–16

The appellant was about 16 years and 1½ months old at the time of the incident. The Juvenile Justice Board conducted a preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (“JJ Act”), after which the appellant was tried as an adult and sentenced to 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment.

pp. 5–6, paras 10–12 · p. 13, para 22

He appealed, contending that the Children’s Court had not complied with Section 19(1) of the JJ Act.

pp. 9–10, paras 20–21

02Issues

i.Whether the Children’s Court’s failure to comply with Section 19(1) of the JJ Act vitiated the appellant’s trial and conviction.

pp. 9–10, paras 20–21 · p. 13, para 22

ii.Whether the matter should be remanded for the required determination under Section 19(1), given the appellant’s age at the time of appeal.

p. 13, para 22

03Law Applied

Sections 15 and 18(3) of the JJ Act provide for the Juvenile Justice Board’s preliminary assessment and, where appropriate, transfer of the case to the Children’s Court for trial as an adult.

pp. 10–13, para 21

Under Section 19(1), the Children’s Court must independently consider whether the child should be tried as an adult; the court relied on Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Thirumoorthy v. State, as discussed in Sagar v. State of Haryana, for the principle that this duty is mandatory and that “may” in Section 19(1) is to be read as “shall”.

pp. 10–13, para 21

Non-compliance with this mandatory requirement vitiates the trial.

pp. 11–13, para 21

Provisions in the judgment · 13 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Section 415

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 Section 5 Section 6

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 164 Section 207 Section 313

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. Section 2 Section 9 Section 15 Section 18 Section 19 Section 21

Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 302

04Reasoning

Although the Board had conducted a preliminary assessment under Section 15, the Children’s Court had not made the separate determination required by Section 19(1) as to whether the appellant should be tried as an adult.

pp. 12–13, paras 21–22

Applying the cited precedents, the Court held that the omission was not a procedural irregularity that could be overlooked: it vitiated the proceedings.

p. 13, para 22

Since the appellant was approximately 20 years old by the time of the appeal, the Court considered a remand for the Section 19(1) assessment to serve no useful purpose.

p. 13, para 22