01Facts
The Financial Officer of Karnataka State Open University (KSOU) lodged a complaint dated 19.08.2016 against seven accused, including the two petitioners, alleging offences under Sections 406 and 409 read with Section 149 IPC.
¶ 2The complaint rested on an audit report and a Chancellor's Office communication flagging prima facie irregularities in "point Nos. 3 and 4" of the audit report, namely the purchase of 30 computers without tender and a Rs. 1 crore mobilization advance paid to IEM under an MOU.
¶ 2, 19Crime No. 42/2016 was registered at Jayalakshmipuram P.S.
¶ 2The investigating officer filed a 'B' (final) report finding no material for a charge sheet.
¶ 2The complainant filed a protest petition and examined himself as C.W.1, marking Exs. C1–C35.
¶ 3On 31.03.2022 the I Addl. Senior Civil Judge and CJM, Mysuru rejected the 'B' report and, invoking Section 202 CrPC, directed fresh investigation after securing original documents from the complainant.
¶ 3–4, 24Dr. T.D. Devegowda (Crl.P. 6286/2022) is the petitioner who was accused No. 2; Prof. K.S. Rangappa (Crl.P. 7111/2022), former Vice-Chancellor (tenure 2009 to January 2013), is accused No. 1.
¶ 8, 10, 27Both petitioners sought quashing of the 31.03.2022 order and of the FIR and complaint.
¶ 5The audit report (Annexure-F/R8) found no irregularity in the computer purchase.
¶ 6, 26Payments under the MOU were made between 04.09.2013 and 18.05.2015, after the Rangappa tenure ended.
¶ 27–2802Issues
i.1. Whether the petitioner in Crl.P. 6286/2022 has made out a ground to quash the proceedings in Crime No. 42/2016 by setting aside the Magistrate's order dated 31.03.2022 directing fresh investigation.
¶ 17(i) · ¶ 18ii.2. Whether the petitioner in Crl.P. 7111/2022 has made out a ground to quash the proceedings in Crime No. 42/2016 by setting aside the Magistrate's order dated 31.03.2022 directing fresh investigation.
¶ 17(ii) · ¶ 1803Law Applied
Section 482 CrPC is the source of the High Court's inherent power to quash and to direct further, fresh, de novo or re-investigation.
¶ 20, 22Sections 156(3), 173(8) and 202 CrPC confine a Magistrate to ordering further investigation, not fresh or de novo investigation, and limit Section 202 enquiry to deciding whether process should issue.
¶ 15, 20–23Per Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali (2013) 5 SCC 762, a Magistrate has no power to direct fresh or de novo investigation, but may accept or reject a police report.
¶ 19–20Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (1976) 3 SCC 252, as explained in Kishan Lal v. Dharmendra Bafna (2009) 7 SCC 685, holds that Section 202 inquiry is meant to assist the Magistrate in completing complaint proceedings, not to initiate a fresh police case.
¶ 21Chandra Babu v. State (2015) 8 SCC 774 and Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat (2019) 17 SCC 1 confirm that only Superior Courts may order re-investigation or de novo investigation, and that the Magistrate's power to order further investigation must be used cautiously.
¶ 22–23National Bank of Oman v. Barakara Abdul Aziz (2013) 2 SCC 488 describes the limited scope of Section 202 enquiry.
¶ 15Dr. Ravikumar v. Mrs. K.M.C. Vasantha ILR 2018 KAR 1725 was cited by the petitioners.
¶ 5State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (Guidelines 4, 5, 7) and Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate (1998) 5 SCC 749 hold that prosecution is not permissible where the complaint discloses no offence against the accused, or where it is actuated by vengeance.
¶ 29Provisions in the judgment · 10 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 482Section 202Section 173Section 203Section 204Section 156Section 190
Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 406Section 409Section 149
04Reasoning
The Magistrate exceeded jurisdiction. Although the order was styled under Section 202, its operative direction to conduct "fresh investigation by securing all the original documents" was a direction for fresh investigation, which the Magistrate could not order.
¶ 24–25, 31The 'B' report had been filed after investigation and rejected without reasons addressing the audit findings.
¶ 3, 31As to the petitioner in 6286/2022, the audit report (Annexure-F) gave a clean chit on the computer purchase, which was the only specific allegation against him, and the Chancellor's communication's reference to "prima facie illegality" was a general observation not borne out by the audit findings on point No. 3.
¶ 26As to the petitioner in 7111/2022, no payment was made during his tenure. The Rs. 1 crore mobilization advance was approved and paid only after his term ended, the agreement was signed by the Registrar, and the admitted payments were made between 2013 and 2015.
¶ 27–28, 30Relying on Bhajan Lal and Pepsi Foods, prosecution in these circumstances would amount to vengeance rather than a legitimate criminal proceeding.
¶ 29–30The complainant's argument that quashing of a second complaint (Crime No. 53/2019) was not a bar was addressed, the court noting that the main complaint in Crime No. 42/2016 remained pending against both petitioners.
¶ 11, 1905Holding
Both points are answered in favour of the petitioners (recorded as "negative" at para 31): the Magistrate lacked power to order fresh investigation and no prima facie case existed against either petitioner.
¶ 31–32Both criminal petitions are allowed. The order dated 31.03.2022 is set aside, the 'B' report is accepted, and proceedings against the petitioners in Crime No. 42/2016 are dropped.
¶ 33Original Court PDF
DR T D DEVEGOWDAvsSTATE OF KARNATAKA
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