Supreme CourtCommercial and Corporate LawCivil Procedure and Evidence

Mall-Unit Buyers’ Appeals Against Resolution Plan Dismissed As A Day Late; Supreme Court Says Holiday Rule Can’t Extend IBC’s 15-Day Grace Period

Lulu Inernational Shopping Malls Private Limitedv.Gorinka Pratyusha

Mall-Unit Buyers’ Appeals Against Resolution Plan Dismissed As A Day Late; Supreme Court Says Holiday Rule Can’t Extend IBC’s 15-Day Grace Period. Lulu Inernational Shopping Malls Private Limited vs Gorinka Pratyusha. Supreme Court. LawLens
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In brief

The question

1. Whether Section 4 of the Limitation Act permits an appeal under Section 61(2) of the IBC to be filed after the statutory 30-day period plus the maximum 15-day condonable extension, where the final day falls on a day the tribunal is closed.

The court held

The Supreme Court held that the NCLAT illegally entertained the respondents’ time-barred appeals and failed to apply Tata Steel.

It also directed

It allowed Lulu’s appeals, set aside the NCLAT’s order dismissing the recall applications, allowed those applications, and set aside the NCLAT’s order condoning delay. The respondents’ appeals before the NCLAT were dismissed as time-barred.

The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

01Facts

The NCLT approved Lulu International Shopping Malls Private Limited’s resolution plan for Manjeera Retail Holdings Private Limited on 26 March 2025.

¶ 3–4

Gorinka Pratyusha and Srinivas and Rajani Kalluri, who claimed to have paid the full consideration for commercial units, appealed the approval, alleging that their claims had been wrongly recorded as customer advances rather than recognised as financial creditors.

¶ 3–4

The respondents filed their appeals on 11 May 2025, the 46th day. The NCLAT condoned the delay under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, because the 45th day fell on a Saturday.

¶ 5

Lulu sought recall of that order, relying on Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee; the NCLAT dismissed the recall applications, prompting these appeals.

¶ 6–8

02Issues

i.1. Whether Section 4 of the Limitation Act permits an appeal under Section 61(2) of the IBC to be filed after the statutory 30-day period plus the maximum 15-day condonable extension, where the final day falls on a day the tribunal is closed.

¶ 7, 12, 14

ii.2. Whether the NCLAT could—and should—recall its order condoning the respondents’ delay by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016.

¶ 8–12

03Law Applied

Section 61(2) of the IBC requires an appeal to be filed within 30 days and permits condonation for no more than a further 15 days.

¶ 5

Under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, the benefit of filing when a court or tribunal reopens applies only where the prescribed limitation period expires while it is closed; it does not extend a discretionary condonable period beyond that prescribed period.

¶ 7, 9

In Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee (2025) 9 SCC 483, the Supreme Court held that “prescribed period” in Section 4 means the period of limitation, not an additional period that a court or tribunal may allow in its discretion.

¶ 7, 9

Although the NCLAT has no power of review under the IBC, Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules preserves its inherent power to recall an order on sufficient grounds; that power is distinct from review (Union Bank of India v. Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian and Union Bank of India v. Financial Creditors of Amtek Auto Ltd.).

¶ 10

Courts and tribunals may also exercise ancillary or incidental powers, in appropriate cases, to recall orders to do justice (Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni).

¶ 11

Provisions in the judgment · 3 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Section 61Section 62

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 4

04Reasoning

The respondents filed their appeals on the 46th day, beyond both the 30-day prescribed period and the maximum 15-day extension under Section 61(2).

¶ 5, 12

Under Tata Steel, Section 4 could not extend that discretionary 15-day period merely because its final day fell on a tribunal holiday.

¶ 7, 9, 12

The appeals were e-filed on Sunday, 11 May 2025, and could likewise have been e-filed on Saturday, 10 May 2025.

¶ 12

The NCLAT therefore erred in refusing recall: the governing precedent pre-dated its order of 10 October 2025, and its inherent jurisdiction was available to correct the order.

¶ 9–12

The condonation order had not attained finality because Lulu’s recall applications kept the issue alive, and the Supreme Court could review it under Section 62 of the IBC.

¶ 13

05Holding

The Supreme Court held that the NCLAT illegally entertained the respondents’ time-barred appeals and failed to apply Tata Steel.

¶ 14

It allowed Lulu’s appeals, set aside the NCLAT’s order dismissing the recall applications, allowed those applications, and set aside the NCLAT’s order condoning delay. The respondents’ appeals before the NCLAT were dismissed as time-barred.

¶ 15

The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

¶ 15
Supreme Court

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Lulu Inernational Shopping Malls Private LimitedvsGorinka Pratyusha

Supreme Court · November 16, 2026

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