01Facts
The NCLT approved Lulu International Shopping Malls Private Limited’s resolution plan for Manjeera Retail Holdings Private Limited on 26 March 2025.
¶ 3–4Gorinka Pratyusha and Srinivas and Rajani Kalluri, who claimed to have paid the full consideration for commercial units, appealed the approval, alleging that their claims had been wrongly recorded as customer advances rather than recognised as financial creditors.
¶ 3–4The respondents filed their appeals on 11 May 2025, the 46th day. The NCLAT condoned the delay under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, because the 45th day fell on a Saturday.
¶ 5Lulu sought recall of that order, relying on Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee; the NCLAT dismissed the recall applications, prompting these appeals.
¶ 6–802Issues
i.1. Whether Section 4 of the Limitation Act permits an appeal under Section 61(2) of the IBC to be filed after the statutory 30-day period plus the maximum 15-day condonable extension, where the final day falls on a day the tribunal is closed.
¶ 7, 12, 14ii.2. Whether the NCLAT could—and should—recall its order condoning the respondents’ delay by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016.
¶ 8–1203Law Applied
Section 61(2) of the IBC requires an appeal to be filed within 30 days and permits condonation for no more than a further 15 days.
¶ 5Under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, the benefit of filing when a court or tribunal reopens applies only where the prescribed limitation period expires while it is closed; it does not extend a discretionary condonable period beyond that prescribed period.
¶ 7, 9In Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee (2025) 9 SCC 483, the Supreme Court held that “prescribed period” in Section 4 means the period of limitation, not an additional period that a court or tribunal may allow in its discretion.
¶ 7, 9Although the NCLAT has no power of review under the IBC, Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules preserves its inherent power to recall an order on sufficient grounds; that power is distinct from review (Union Bank of India v. Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian and Union Bank of India v. Financial Creditors of Amtek Auto Ltd.).
¶ 10Courts and tribunals may also exercise ancillary or incidental powers, in appropriate cases, to recall orders to do justice (Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni).
¶ 11Provisions in the judgment · 3 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Section 61Section 62
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 4
04Reasoning
The respondents filed their appeals on the 46th day, beyond both the 30-day prescribed period and the maximum 15-day extension under Section 61(2).
¶ 5, 12Under Tata Steel, Section 4 could not extend that discretionary 15-day period merely because its final day fell on a tribunal holiday.
¶ 7, 9, 12The appeals were e-filed on Sunday, 11 May 2025, and could likewise have been e-filed on Saturday, 10 May 2025.
¶ 12The NCLAT therefore erred in refusing recall: the governing precedent pre-dated its order of 10 October 2025, and its inherent jurisdiction was available to correct the order.
¶ 9–12The condonation order had not attained finality because Lulu’s recall applications kept the issue alive, and the Supreme Court could review it under Section 62 of the IBC.
¶ 1305Holding
The Supreme Court held that the NCLAT illegally entertained the respondents’ time-barred appeals and failed to apply Tata Steel.
¶ 14It allowed Lulu’s appeals, set aside the NCLAT’s order dismissing the recall applications, allowed those applications, and set aside the NCLAT’s order condoning delay. The respondents’ appeals before the NCLAT were dismissed as time-barred.
¶ 15The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
¶ 15Original Court PDF
Lulu Inernational Shopping Malls Private LimitedvsGorinka Pratyusha
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