Mandatory school fee committee constitution stayed due to unworkable timelines and pending constitutional challenge.

The Delhi School Education (Transparency in Fixation and Regulation of Fees) Act, 2025 (“the Act”) and its corresponding Rules came into force on December 10, 2025, to regulate school fees.

On February 1, 2026, the Respondents issued a "Removal of Difficulties" Notification ("the Notification") under Section 21 of the Act.

This Notification accelerated the statutory timelines for the constitution of School Level Fee Regulation Committees (SLFRC) and the submission of fee proposals for the 2026-27 academic block, requiring compliance by February 10 and 24, 2024, respectively.

This deviated from the original statutory dates (July 15 and 31).

Petitioner school associations challenged the Notification as ultra vires the Act and sought an interim stay on its implementation pending final disposal of the main petitions challenging the Act's constitutionality.

The court primarily applied Section 21 of the Delhi School Education (Transparency in Fixation and Regulation of Fees) Act, 2025, which limits the power to remove difficulties to actions "not inconsistent" with the Act’s provisions.

It relied on the principle from Madeva Upendra Sinai v. Union of India that "Removal of Difficulty" (Henry VIII) clauses only permit minor adaptations and peripheral adjustments, not changes to the substance of a statute.

It further considered Section 5(7) of the Act, which allows schools to collect the previous year's fee during a pending fee-fixation reference.

The principles for granting interim injunctions (prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss) as established in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd.

The Court observed that the Notification's revised timelines appeared prima facie unworkable and inconsistent with the Act's scheme.

Specifically, the Notification failed to provide timelines for appeals to the District Fee Appellate Committee (Section 6), which is essential if an SLFRC fails to reach a "unanimous" decision under Section 5(4).

The Court rejected the Respondents' argument that Section 3 created a blanket ban on collecting fees until approval; instead, it found that Section 5(7) expressly permits schools to collect the previous year's fee while approval is pending.

Therefore, no "difficulty" existed requiring urgent executive intervention via a non-obstante clause.

The Court noted practical hurdles, such as the unavailability of audited financial statements for FY 2025-26 and the ongoing Board Examinations, which hindered the physical selection of parent representatives.

It held that the constitution of SLFRCs shall be deferred until the final hearing on March 12, 2026.

Schools are permitted to collect the same fees for the Academic Year 2026-27 as were collected in the previous year.

The Court clarified that no irreparable loss would be caused to students as any "exorbitant" or "excess" fees collected during this period would remain subject to final adjudication and could be adjusted or refunded post-judgment.

The applications for stay were disposed of accordingly.