Mere eligibility or vacancy does not confer a right to retrospective promotion.

The petitioner joined the Punjab Mandi Board as a Typist on 16.10.1986 and was promoted as Senior Assistant on 21.12.2011. By order dated 12.02.2015, he was granted a deemed date of promotion as Senior Assistant with effect from 15.10.1992.

Under the Punjab State Agricultural Marketing Board (Class II) Service Rules, 1988, promotion from Senior Assistant to Secretary, Market Committee, required 12 years’ service as Senior Assistant. The petitioner claimed that, on the basis of his deemed date, he became eligible on 15.10.2004 and ought to have been considered against the 12th vacancy arising on 30.04.2017.

The petitioner asserted that several vacancies arose in the Secretary, Market Committee cadre during 2016–2017 and that he was placed at serial no. 86 in the seniority list of eligible Senior Assistants. He submitted representations dated 06.06.2017 and 25.02.2020 seeking promotion.

The respondents rejected his claim by order dated 02.06.2020, considering instead his claim for promotion as Superintendent Grade-II and stating that no vacancy was available before his retirement on 31.07.2018.

1. Whether the petitioner was entitled to promotion as Secretary, Market Committee, with effect from 01.05.2017, merely because the 12th vacancy in the promotional quota arose on that date and he was eligible under the applicable service rules?

2. Whether the respondents were required to grant the petitioner retrospective or deemed promotion before his retirement, notwithstanding that persons senior to him were awaiting promotion and no promotion had actually been granted to him during service?

3. Whether the order dated 02.06.2020 was liable to be quashed for considering the petitioner’s claim for Superintendent Grade-II rather than granting promotion as Secretary, Market Committee?

The Court applied the Punjab State Agricultural Marketing Board (Class II) Service Rules, 1988, under which promotion to Secretary, Market Committee, was governed by the prescribed quota, seniority and qualifying-experience requirements.

It noted that the rules were amended on 08.10.2018, reducing the requisite experience from 12 years to seven years, but the amendment could not retrospectively confer a promotion right upon an employee who had retired before the amendment.

The Court relied on Bihar State Electricity Board v. Dharamdeo Das, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1768, holding that promotion takes effect from the date it is actually granted, not from the date of occurrence of a vacancy; an employee has a right to be considered for promotion but no fundamental right to promotion or retrospective promotion.

It also relied on Nirmal Chandra Sinha v. Union of India, 2008 (2) SCT 675, and the authorities cited therein, including Union of India v. K.K. Vadera, reiterating that promotion takes effect from the date it is granted and not from the date of vacancy.

Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration v. Tarlochan Singh, 2014 (3) SCT 330, establishes that an employee cannot claim promotion from the date a vacancy arises, absent mala fides or colourable exercise of power.

Finally, I. Chuba Jamir v. State of Nagaland, 2010 (1) SCT 183, holds that mere eligibility does not confer a right to promotion.

The Court accepted that, in view of the deemed date of promotion as Senior Assistant, the petitioner could claim eligibility for consideration after completing 12 years of service on 15.10.2004.

However, eligibility did not entitle him to appointment against a particular vacancy. The petitioner stood at serial no. 86, while employees senior to him at serial nos. 80–84 were awaiting promotion and were promoted only on 05.12.2018 and 14.02.2019; the employees junior to him were also promoted on 14.02.2019, after his retirement.

Consequently, there was no basis for directing retrospective promotion from 01.05.2017, the date on which the claimed vacancy arose.

Applying the settled rule that promotion becomes effective only upon actual grant and cannot ordinarily be claimed from the date of vacancy, the Court held that the petitioner’s claim was for promotion itself, rather than merely consideration for promotion.

The Court also noted that the petitioner had not been promoted as Superintendent Grade-II because no vacancy was available and had instead received the applicable ACP step-up.

Since persons senior to him were available for promotion and no promotion had actually been granted to him before retirement, retrospective or deemed promotion could not be directed.

The challenge to the order dated 02.06.2020 was therefore rejected, and the writ petition was dismissed with no order as to costs.