Mother-in-Law Personally Signed And Took Rs 3.6 Crore: Delhi HC Rejects Daughter-in-Law’s Challenge To 24-Year-Old Consent Decree

The plaintiffs obtained a compromise decree for specific performance on 20 September 2002 concerning late Raisina Bhatia’s 31.25% share in the suit property.

Bhatia had signed the compromise application and supporting affidavit, appeared in person, affirmed the settlement on oath, received the balance consideration in Court, and handed over possession.

In 2026, her daughter-in-law, Sangeeta Bhatia, applied under Order XXIII Rule 3 read with Sections 47 and 151 CPC to have the decree declared void for alleged fraud and want of authority, to be impleaded, and to stay execution.

She also argued that the compromise violated Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and that the decree exceeded the relief sought in the plaint.

The plaintiffs opposed the application, relying on the record of Raisina Bhatia’s personal participation, the delay, and the absence of any challenge by her or the other heirs.

Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC requires the Court to be satisfied that a compromise is lawful; a consent decree is binding unless set aside by the Court that recorded it, on a finding that no valid compromise existed (Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh).

A compromise decree operates as a contract with the Court’s approval, and a fraud allegation must be pleaded with specific particulars (Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai).

A successor-in-interest ordinarily cannot claim a better right than the predecessor (Imdad Ali v. Keshav Chand); under Sections 2(a) and 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963, succession does not restart time once it has begun to run, and Section 17 requires relevant concealed fraud.

Section 44 TPA restricts a non-family transferee’s joint possession or common enjoyment of an undivided family dwelling house; it does not prohibit transfer of a co-owner’s share, and the protection is available to non-transferring family members (Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden).

Order XXIII Rule 3 permits a decree in accordance with a lawful compromise even where its subject matter differs from that of the suit.

A court executing a decree cannot go behind it and must give effect to its tenor (Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman).

The Court found that the decree rested on Raisina Bhatia’s own signed compromise, sworn affidavit, and in-person statement; she had received the consideration and delivered possession, and the Court had expressly found the settlement bona fide and lawful.

The alleged powers of attorney were steps contemplated by the settlement, not its basis, and the application provided no particulars establishing fraud.

The applicant claimed only through Raisina Bhatia, who never challenged the decree during her lifetime; neither her son, the applicant’s husband, nor the other heirs had done so.

The Court held that Section 44 TPA did not give the transferor or her successors a basis to undo the transfer, and that the compromise, read as a whole, distinguished the portion in Raisina Bhatia’s possession from the tenanted portions.

The applicant therefore established no basis to invalidate the decree or to be impleaded in the disposed suit; execution-related objections remained for the Executing Court.

It clarified that the applicant’s pending execution applications, EX.APPL.(OS) 578/2026 and 579/2026, were to be considered by the Executing Court in accordance with law, consistently with the findings on the decree’s validity.