MP HC Orders 3-Month Decision On Retired Tax Worker’s Claim To Count 1980–2006 Service For Pension

The petitioner was appointed as a Hammal on 14 March 1980 and claimed uninterrupted service thereafter.

He was accommodated in the contingency-paid establishment as a Peon in 2001 and given a regular appointment as Farrash in 2006.

On his retirement on 29 February 2024, the respondents calculated his retiral benefits by counting service only from 2006.

The petitioner submitted a representation seeking recognition of his earlier service, relying on Rule 6 of the M.P. (Work Charged and Contingency Paid Employees) Pension Rules, 1979, and Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of M.P. and Others.

The State opposed the claim, contending that the initial appointment was not made through due process.

Article 226 of the Constitution provides the basis for the High Court’s writ jurisdiction.

Rule 6 of the M.P. (Work Charged and Contingency Paid Employees) Pension Rules, 1979, was invoked by the petitioner as the basis for his claim, but the Court did not interpret or apply it to determine entitlement.

The Court directed the authority to take account of Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of M.P. and Others, W.P. No. 12237/2019, order dated 10 August 2023, without stating or deciding the precedent’s substantive rule in this judgment.

The petitioner had already submitted a detailed representation, and the parties disputed whether his pre-2006 service could count toward retiral benefits.

Rather than resolve that dispute or determine the effect of Rule 6, the Court considered it appropriate to require the competent authority to decide the representation in accordance with law and to take Ashok Kumar Yadav into account.

The Court therefore left the merits open.

Respondent No. 2 was directed to decide the representation within three months of communication of the order, considering Ashok Kumar Yadav.

If the petitioner is found entitled to benefits by counting service from his initial appointment, consequential benefits must be paid within that period; if not, the authority must issue a reasoned speaking order within the same period.

The direction refers to the initial appointment as being “in the year 1979,” although the facts state that the petitioner was appointed on 14 March 1980.