No Bribe Recovered From DSIIDC Clerk, No Demand By Him: Delhi HC Suspends 4-Year Sentence Pending Appeal

The appellant was convicted in CBI 48/2021 and sentenced to concurrent terms of four years’ rigorous imprisonment, with fines, for offences under Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120B IPC read with Section 7 of the PC Act.

He sought suspension of sentence and release on bail pending appeal under Section 480 BNSS/Section 389(1) CrPC.

The prosecution case arose from an alleged bribe demand connected with execution of a lease deed.

The appellant was not apprehended during the trap, and no recovery was made from him.

The appellant had been on bail during trial and there was no allegation that he misused that liberty.

He contended, among other things, that the evidence did not establish a demand by him and that the appeal was unlikely to be heard soon.

Under Section 389(1) CrPC, an appellate court may suspend execution of a sentence and release a convicted person on bail pending appeal.

In Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai v. State of Gujarat, (1999) 4 SCC 421, the Supreme Court held that suspension may be considered liberally where the sentence is for a fixed period, absent exceptional circumstances; if the appeal cannot be heard expeditiously, suspension may be necessary to preserve the effective right of appeal.

Suresh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 10 SCC 338, reiterated that principle.

For the underlying corruption offence, B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 55, states that demand of illegal gratification is essential to an offence under Section 7 PC Act and that mere recovery is insufficient without proof of voluntary acceptance with knowledge that the money was a bribe.

The Court also relied on Sunil Kumar v. Vipin Kumar, (2014) 8 SCC 868, which recognised prior compliance with bail conditions and the remoteness of an appeal being heard as relevant considerations under Section 389 CrPC.

The Court treated the four-year sentence as a fixed-term sentence and applied the principle that suspension should be considered liberally unless exceptional circumstances exist.

It noted that no money was recovered from the appellant; the complainant and the shadow witness testified that the appellant did not demand money, and the Investigating Officer confirmed that the appellant was not mentioned in the verification report and that no recovery was made from him.

Referring to B. Jayaraj, the Court considered these matters sufficient to disclose a prima facie case for suspension, without determining the appeal on its merits.

It further found that the appeal was unlikely to be heard in the near future, that the appellant had remained on bail during trial without alleged misuse, and that requiring him to serve a substantial part of the sentence before the appeal was heard could render the appeal right ineffective.

It directed the appellant’s release on a personal bond of ₹25,000 with one surety for the like amount, subject to conditions concerning maintaining and reporting contact details and address, appearing when required, and not leaving India without the Court’s permission.

The Court clarified that its observations were limited to the suspension application and did not express a view on the merits of the appeal.