Officiating headmasters entitled to salary arrears from date of taking charge, not just three years: Allahabad High Court

The petitioners were assistant teachers working as officiating or acting headmasters in institutions under the Basic Education Department, Uttar Pradesh.

They claimed entitlement to the salary payable to a regular headmaster for the period during which they discharged the duties of that higher post.

A similar claim had been allowed by the Single Judge in Tripurari Dubey v. State of U.P., Writ–A No. 18228 of 2022, directing payment of arrears from the date on which the petitioners began functioning as officiating headmasters.

The State challenged that decision in Special Appeal No. 652 of 2024.

By judgment dated 30 May 2025, the Division Bench upheld the entitlement to headmaster’s salary but limited arrears to three years preceding the filing of the writ petition, relying principally on Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, Bichitrananda Behera v. State of Orissa, and Urmila Devi Pal v. State of U.P.

The Division Bench also directed the District Basic Education Officer to verify whether the concerned petitioners had five years’ experience and had actually continued as officiating headmasters.

Subsequently, the State issued Government Orders dated 14 October 2025 and 16 July 2026 concerning payment of salary to in-charge headmasters.

In the present batch, the petitioners challenged the restriction of arrears to three years, relying upon the Supreme Court’s later decision in Maya Banerjee v. Union of India, which considered S.K. Mastan Bee v. General Manager, South Central Railway and held that Tarsem Singh could not govern where it had failed to consider the earlier decision.

1. Whether the petitioners, having worked as officiating headmasters, were entitled to the salary payable to the post of headmaster for the entire period of such service, rather than only for three years preceding the filing of the writ petition?

2. Whether the three-year restriction imposed by the Division Bench in Tripurari Dubey, on the basis of Tarsem Singh, could continue after the Supreme Court’s subsequent treatment of Tarsem Singh in Maya Banerjee?

3. Whether the Single Judge was bound to retain the three-year limitation because the Division Bench’s judgment was otherwise binding?

The Court applied the principle of equal pay for work performed on a higher post, holding that an assistant teacher who actually performs the duties of an officiating headmaster should not be denied the corresponding headmaster’s salary.

It considered Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, which recognizes continuing wrongs in service matters but states that arrears are normally restricted to three years preceding the writ petition.

However, the Court relied on S.K. Mastan Bee v. General Manager, South Central Railway, which held that delayed claims for legally due pensionary benefits may be granted from the date they became due, particularly where the obligation to pay rests on the employer.

In Maya Banerjee v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held that Tarsem Singh had not considered S.K. Mastan Bee and therefore could not control the issue.

A binding precedent of a Division Bench could not prevail to the extent that its underlying legal basis had been displaced by a subsequent Supreme Court judgment.

The Court accepted that the Division Bench’s decision in Tripurari Dubey remained binding insofar as it recognized the petitioners’ entitlement to headmaster’s salary and prescribed verification of their actual service as officiating headmasters.

However, the specific restriction of arrears to three years was founded exclusively on Tarsem Singh.

Since Maya Banerjee held that Tarsem Singh was rendered per incuriam for failing to consider S.K. Mastan Bee, the foundation for the three-year limitation no longer survived.

The Court rejected the State’s distinction between pension and salary, reasoning that salary is also a valuable property accruing from services actually rendered.

Accordingly, the petitioners’ delayed approach to the Court did not justify depriving them of salary for the period during which they had actually discharged the functions of officiating headmasters, subject to factual verification under the directions already issued by the Division Bench.

The Court maintained all directions issued by the Division Bench in Tripurari Dubey, including verification by the District Basic Education Officer regarding the petitioners’ requisite experience and actual service as officiating headmasters.

However, it set aside the restriction limiting arrears to three years preceding the filing of the writ petition.

The petitioners were held entitled to headmaster’s salary from the date on which each petitioner began functioning as an officiating headmaster until actual payment or realization.