01Facts
The petitioner challenged the Labour Commissioner’s order granting the employer approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for his dismissal.
¶ 2The dismissal followed a domestic inquiry into allegations that he had submitted a fake educational certificate; the petitioner disputed the inquiry and raised objections including non-supply of documents, denial of natural justice, protected-workman status, victimisation, and the effect of a tripartite settlement.
¶ 2–4The Labour Commissioner allowed the approval application on 7 March 2025.
¶ 3Before the High Court, the petitioner sought certiorari and consequential reinstatement with back wages and continuity of service.
¶ 102Issues
i.Whether the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 to examine the challenge to the approval order and dismissal, despite the statutory remedy available under Section 2A of the Act.
¶ 7, 18–21ii.Whether the petitioner’s allegations of procedural unfairness and other disputed matters warranted bypassing that statutory remedy.
¶ 19–2003Law Applied
Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 requires an employer, in the circumstances specified by that provision, to obtain approval for the action taken against a workman; the authority considers, among other matters, whether a proper domestic inquiry was held, a prima facie case was made out, and the proviso’s mandatory requirements were met.
¶ 8An approval order does not itself foreclose the workman’s right to seek adjudication of the dismissal.
¶ 9Section 2A deems an individual workman’s dispute concerning dismissal or termination to be an industrial dispute and provides a statutory route for adjudication, subject to its requirements.
¶ 10Although an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to Article 226 relief, the High Court ordinarily declines to intervene where an effective statutory remedy exists, particularly where disputed facts require evidence; recognised exceptions include enforcement of fundamental rights, breach of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, and challenges to statutory vires (Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1).
¶ 19Provisions in the judgment · 3
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Section 33Section 12Section 2A
04Reasoning
The petitioner’s challenge extended beyond the Labour Commissioner’s approval decision to the merits and fairness of the disciplinary proceedings, including the evidence concerning the certificate, the alleged non-supply of documents, protected-workman status, victimisation, and the tripartite settlement.
¶ 12–17Those matters required examination of the inquiry record, evidence, and parties’ explanations, and could not appropriately be determined on the writ pleadings alone.
¶ 13, 15–18The Court held that the alleged natural-justice violations principally concerned the conduct and evidentiary basis of the inquiry and could be examined by the competent industrial forum; the allegations did not, on the facts presented, justify bypassing the Section 2A remedy.
¶ 19–2105Holding
The Court declined to adjudicate the merits of the dismissal or the approval order and dismissed the writ petition on the ground that an efficacious statutory remedy was available under Section 2A of the Act.
¶ 21–23It left all factual and legal questions open and granted the petitioner liberty to pursue that remedy in accordance with law.
¶ 22–23Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, were also disposed of.
¶ 24Original Court PDF
Bhupendra SinghvsLabour Commissioner Haryana And Another
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