Panchayat Shiksha Mitra serving on 1 July 2006 is absorbed as Panchayat Teacher.

The petitioner was appointed as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra at Primary School, Katiyama, Jamui, on 1 July 2005 and joined on 2 July 2005.

He claimed that he continued to discharge his duties, participated in CRC and BRC meetings, undertook election-related duties, and was reflected in attendance and official records, although he allegedly received no remuneration.

The petitioner later alleged that respondent no. 11 had been appointed in his place on the basis of a forged resignation letter.

The District Teachers Appointment Appellate Authority initially cancelled respondent no. 11’s appointment, but the matter was remitted by the High Court for determination of disputed facts, including verification of the alleged resignation letter.

On remand, the District Authority again ruled in favour of the petitioner on 7 March 2020.

Respondent no. 11 appealed, and the State Appellate Authority, by order dated 23 August 2022, set aside the District Authority’s order, holding that respondent no. 11 was working as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra on 1 July 2006 and was therefore entitled to absorption as Panchayat Teacher under the 2006 Rules.

The petitioner challenged that order under Article 226 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the State Appellate Authority erred in setting aside the District Appellate Authority’s order and in upholding respondent no. 11’s appointment despite the petitioner’s assertion that he continued in service and that the resignation letter relied upon against him was forged.

2. Whether respondent no. 11, being in service as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra on 1 July 2006, was entitled to be treated as a Panchayat Teacher under the Bihar Panchayat Primary Teachers (Employment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006, notwithstanding the dispute regarding the petitioner’s resignation.

3. Whether respondent no. 11’s appointment was invalid for want of a fresh advertisement and for having been made shortly after the petitioner’s alleged resignation.

The Court applied the Bihar Panchayat Primary Teachers (Employment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006, particularly Rule 20, under which the earlier Panchayat Shiksha Mitra scheme stood repealed and persons working as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra on 1 July 2006 were treated in accordance with the statutory framework for Panchayat Teachers.

Relying on the Full Bench decision in Kalpana Rani v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2014 (2) PLJR 665, the Court held that the 2006 Rules abolished the Panchayat Shiksha Mitra posts from 1 July 2006 and that entitlement to absorption depended upon actual service on that date; mere empanelment or an earlier claim could not create a right to appointment after abolition of the scheme.

The petitioner also relied on Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 169, concerning the foundational requirements for admitting and proving secondary evidence, particularly where the original document is not produced.

The Court’s ultimate decision rested on the respondent’s service status on 1 July 2006 and the effect of the 2006 Rules.

The Court noted that the alleged resignation could not be conclusively examined because the original document was never produced before the handwriting expert, the Criminal Investigation Bureau, or the Forensic Science Laboratory.

The District Authority nevertheless undertook its own comparison of signatures and found the petitioner’s signature on the resignation letter to be different, whereas the State Appellate Authority relied principally on the fact that respondent no. 11 was working on 1 July 2006.

Applying Rule 20 of the 2006 Rules and Kalpana Rani, the Court held that the decisive consideration was whether respondent no. 11 was actually working as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra on the statutory cut-off date.

The petitioner did not deny that respondent no. 11 was working on 1 July 2006, and the record did not establish a legally sustainable basis for displacing respondent no. 11’s consequent status under the 2006 Rules.

The Court also observed that the petitioner raised the challenge only in 2010, several years after respondent no. 11’s appointment, a circumstance considered by the State Appellate Authority.

Consequently, the Court found no infirmity in the State Appellate Authority’s decision.

The writ petition challenging the State Appellate Authority’s order dated 23 August 2022 was dismissed, and the petitioner’s claims for restoration, arrears of salary, and consequential benefits were rejected.

Any pending interlocutory application was also disposed of.