Parole restrictions under Rule 1211 are not absolute; special circumstances must be considered.

The petitioner, a life convict, challenged the Home Department’s order dated 25 June 2026 rejecting his parole application.

The rejection relied on a prison punishment, his having absconded from parole for approximately fourteen years, allegedly unsatisfactory conduct, and the absence of recommendations from prison authorities.

The petitioner disputed the basis and adequacy of those reasons, including the failure to consider whether special circumstances justified parole.

The Court noted that the Nominal Roll recorded satisfactory conduct for the last year, differed from the impugned order as to the punishment date, and recorded the Jail Superintendent’s recommendation as “N/A”.

Whether the rejection of parole under Rule 1210(II) of the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018 was sustainable when the order did not identify whether the punishment was major or minor and the Nominal Roll recorded a different punishment date and satisfactory recent conduct.

Whether Rule 1211 of the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018 imposed an absolute bar to parole, or required the competent authority to consider whether special circumstances warranted parole.

Whether the impugned order adequately considered the petitioner’s circumstances and the prison authorities’ recommendations.

Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, were invoked in the petition.

Rule 1210(II) of the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018 prescribes different periods of good conduct depending on whether a prisoner’s punishment for a prison offence was major or minor.

Rule 1211 provides that parole should not be granted in specified cases, but permits the competent authority to grant it where special circumstances exist; the restriction is therefore not absolute.

The Court relied on Rohit v. The State, W.P. (Crl.) 402/2022 (11 May 2022), and Neeraj Bhatt v. The State (Govt. of NCT) of Delhi, W.P. (Crl.) 3071/2022 (5 January 2023), which affirm that the authority must consider special circumstances when deciding parole applications falling within Rule 1211.

The Court held that the Rule 1210(II) ground required reconsideration because the impugned order did not specify whether the punishment was major or minor, while the Nominal Roll gave a different date and recorded satisfactory conduct over the preceding year; if the punishment was minor, the relevant one-year period had already elapsed before the rejection.

Although the petitioner’s prior absconding from parole for nearly fourteen years remained relevant, Rule 1211 did not make that circumstance an absolute bar. The authority had to assess whether special circumstances justified parole, but the impugned order did not show that it had done so.

The Court also noted that the Nominal Roll recorded the Superintendent’s recommendation as “N/A,” contrary to the impugned order’s statement that parole had not been recommended, and identified the petitioner’s custody, recent conduct, and family circumstances as matters requiring consideration.

The decision was to be communicated to the Jail Superintendent, and the petitioner was left at liberty to pursue appropriate remedies if aggrieved; the petition was disposed of accordingly.