01Facts
The disputed 18 dhurs formed part of a government lease renewed in 1987 for 30 years in favour of Hemant Banerjee and Subir Banerjee.
¶ 3–12In 1988, the authorities permitted Hemant to transfer his share to Tarkeshwar Prasad and petitioner no. 1, and a transfer deed was executed; however, the authorities did not complete approval and registration of the lease in the transferees’ favour.
¶ 3–12Tarkeshwar Prasad and the petitioners made repeated requests and tendered rent.
¶ 3–12The authorities issued communications in 2013 and 2015 proposing cancellation for alleged rent arrears and disputing succession to the lease.
¶ 3–12After Tarkeshwar Prasad’s death in 2013, the petitioners sought recognition of their rights and renewal.
¶ 3–12They applied under Article 226 to quash the cancellation communications and obtain a fresh lease.
¶ 24–3002Issues
i.1. Whether petitioner no. 1 had heritable leasehold rights as a legal heir and co-lessee, notwithstanding the authorities’ failure to complete the lease documentation in favour of the transferees.
¶ 29–36, 40, 43–49ii.2. Whether the communication dated 25 June 2015 proposing cancellation on the grounds of non-payment and absence of heritable rights was sustainable.
¶ 37–50iii.3. Whether the Court should direct execution or renewal of a fresh lease, or instead require the authorities to reconsider the claim on the relevant lease terms and record.
¶ 50–5203Law Applied
The Court relied on Part II, Clause 2 of the 1987 lease, which provided for mutation on succession by inheritance without a transfer fee.
¶ 14, 46It applied the principle that tenancy rights are heritable unless succession is excluded or limited by law or contract, relying on Parvinder Singh v. Renu Gautam, (2004) 4 SCC 794; H.C. Pandey v. G.C. Paul, (1989) 3 SCC 77; and Damadilal v. Parashram, (1976) 4 SCC 855.
¶ 18–20It also invoked the doctrine of approbate and reprobate, as discussed in Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25, and the principle that a party cannot benefit from its own wrong, relying on Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2007) 11 SCC 447.
¶ 33–35The Court referred to Section 31(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, concerning cancellation of instruments that may cause serious injury if left outstanding, and Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, in addressing the petitioners’ asserted rights.
¶ 38–40, 45It also recognised the constitutional protection of property under Article 300A.
¶ 48Provisions in the judgment · 3 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Section 106Section 45
Specific Relief Act, 1963 Section 31
04Reasoning
The Court found that the 1988 transfer had been permitted, the transfer deed executed, and rent tendered, while the authorities’ own delay had prevented completion of the lease documentation.
¶ 26–36, 39–49It further found that the lease contained an inheritance clause and that petitioner no. 1 was both a legal heir and a co-lessee.
¶ 26–36, 39–49The authorities’ later reliance on the absence of a completed lease and on non-payment was therefore untenable, particularly in light of the rent payments and the 2014 approval issued in Tarkeshwar Prasad’s name after his death.
¶ 26–36, 39–49The Court held that the State could not rely on its own prolonged inaction to defeat the petitioner’s asserted rights.
¶ 26–36, 39–49However, rather than itself ordering renewal, it directed the authorities to decide the claim for a fresh lease after considering the specified documents and circumstances.
¶ 51–5205Holding
The Court quashed the communication dated 25 June 2015 insofar as it denied petitioner no. 1’s heritable rights; it held that the 11 February 2013 communication had become infructuous following Tarkeshwar Prasad’s death.
¶ 39, 50The authorities were directed to consider and decide the claim for a fresh lease, in accordance with the original lease terms and the matters identified by the Court, by a reasoned and speaking order within four months.
¶ 51–54The petitioners’ possession was not to be disturbed pending that decision.
¶ 51–54The writ petition was allowed, but the Court did not itself grant or direct automatic renewal of the lease.
¶ 51–54Original Court PDF
Aditya Kumar SinghvsThe State of Bihar
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