Karnataka High CourtArbitration and MediationCivil Procedure and Evidence

Pendency of a review petition is not sufficient cause to condone delay in commercial appeals.

THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER PWP AND IWTD DIVISIONv.M B PATIL CONSTRUCTIONS LIMITED

Pendency of a review petition is not sufficient cause to condone delay in commercial appeals.. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER PWP AND IWTD DIVISION vs M B PATIL CONSTRUCTIONS LIMITED. Karnataka High Court. LawLens
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In brief

The question

1. Whether the delay of 240 days (Department) and 422 days (contractor) in preferring commercial appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act read with Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The court held

The Court held that neither appellant showed sufficient cause for the inordinate delay in preferring the commercial appeals, and that the delay could not be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

It also directed

Both applications for condonation of delay (I.A. No. 3/2026 in COMAP No. 200010/2026 and I.A. No. 1/2026 in COMAP No. 200024/2026) were rejected, and both commercial appeals were dismissed. The Court did not examine the merits of the challenge to the Principal District Judge's judgment dated 02.05.2025.

01Facts

The Executive Engineer, PWP and IWTD Division, Kalaburagi (the "Department") filed Commercial Arbitration Suit No. 5/2019 challenging an arbitral award dated 30.10.2018 and a rectified award dated 08.03.2019 in CMP No. 200006/2014.

The Principal District Judge, Kalaburagi, decided the suit by judgment dated 02.05.2025.

pp. 4–5

The Department stated that the first part of that judgment favoured it, but the second part was ambiguous, so it consulted higher authorities before deciding to appeal.

p. 5

The contractor, M.B. Patil Constructions Ltd., filed Review Petition No. 1/2025 on 02.06.2025 against the portion of the judgment that set aside the award for non-consideration of liquidated damages.

pp. 7–8

The Department opposed the review. On 27.01.2026 the review was dismissed as not maintainable, with liberty to approach the competent court.

p. 5 · pp. 8–9

The contractor filed an execution petition (E.P. No. 6/2026), and the Department filed W.P. No. 200864/2026, disposed of on 23.02.2026.

p. 6

The Department filed COMAP No. 200010/2026 with I.A. No. 3/2026 seeking condonation of a 240-day delay, attributing it to administrative exigencies, official communication gaps and transfers of officials.

pp. 5–6

The contractor filed COMAP No. 200024/2026 with I.A. No. 1/2026 seeking condonation of a 422-day delay, attributing it to the review proceedings, the deponent's illness and delay in instructing counsel.

pp. 7–8

Both sides contended the delay was not intentional.

p. 9

The Court recorded that the delay was admittedly beyond the limitation period and that the only reason assigned was the pendency of the review petition.

p. 10 · ¶ 8

02Issues

i.1. Whether the delay of 240 days (Department) and 422 days (contractor) in preferring commercial appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act read with Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

p. 10 · ¶ 9 · p. 18 · ¶ 13

ii.2. Whether the pendency of a review petition before the Principal District Judge, which was filed by the contractor and not the Department, constitutes "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay.

p. 10 · ¶ 8 · pp. 17–18 · ¶ 12

03Law Applied

The Court applied Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, read with Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribe appeal periods of 90, 30 and 60 days respectively. It applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation.

pp. 16–17 · ¶ 11 · p. 17 · ¶ 11

Following Sheo Raj Singh (D) Tr. LRs v. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531, the Court held that condonation is discretionary, depends on sufficiency of cause and acceptability of the explanation, and that an "explanation" must be distinguished from an "excuse".

pp. 11–12 · ¶ 30–32

Under Sheo Raj Singh, delay beyond the statutory period is to be condoned by way of exception, not rule, and only where the party acted bona fide and not negligently.

pp. 16–17, quoting para. 63

The Court relied on University of Delhi v. Prateek Sharma and State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang on the prejudice factor and the treatment of institutional delay.

pp. 12–13 · ¶ 39–40

The Court relied on Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. v. BHEL, 2025 INSC 533, which held that the Commercial Courts Act seeks speedy disposal, that "sufficient cause" under Section 5 does not extend to long delays, that negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides bars condonation, and that the Government receives no different yardstick.

pp. 13–16 · ¶ 10, 20–21

Provisions in the judgment · 5 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 Section 13

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Section 37

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5Section 116Section 117

04Reasoning

The Court first observed that the appeals were admittedly time-barred and that the sole justification offered was the pendency of the review petition. Relying on Sheo Raj Singh, it reasoned that condonation cannot be granted routinely in commercial matters and that the appellant must establish sufficient cause.

p. 10 · ¶ 8 · p. 17 · ¶ 11

It held that, beyond the pendency of the review, the appellants showed no sufficient cause. In doing so it noted three facts: no interim order was passed in the review petition, and the review was filed by the contractor, not by the Department. The pendency of a proceeding filed by another party therefore did not explain the Department's own inaction, and the same reasoning disposed of the contractor's appeal, whose delay rested on the same review proceedings and on counsel's inaction.

pp. 17–18 · ¶ 12 · pp. 7–8

The Court treated the Department's explanations regarding transfers, record collection and official communication as insufficient to establish cause. Applying the principle that the Commercial Courts Act's speedy-disposal objective prevents elastic reading of "sufficient cause", the Court found the delays of 240 and 422 days, which far exceed the statutory period, could not be excused on the explanations offered.

p. 6 · p. 18 · ¶ 13 · pp. 15–16

05Holding

The Court held that neither appellant showed sufficient cause for the inordinate delay in preferring the commercial appeals, and that the delay could not be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

p. 18 · ¶ 13

Both applications for condonation of delay (I.A. No. 3/2026 in COMAP No. 200010/2026 and I.A. No. 1/2026 in COMAP No. 200024/2026) were rejected, and both commercial appeals were dismissed. The Court did not examine the merits of the challenge to the Principal District Judge's judgment dated 02.05.2025.

p. 18 · ¶ 14(i)–(ii) · p. 18 · ¶ 14
Karnataka High Court

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THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER PWP AND IWTD DIVISIONvsM B PATIL CONSTRUCTIONS LIMITED

Karnataka High Court · October 27, 2026

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