Post-trial amendments correcting property boundaries require proof of due diligence under Order VI Rule 17 CPC.

The petitioner, plaintiff in O.S. No. 257 of 2012 before the Munsiff Court, Changanacherry, instituted a suit against his sister for fixation of the western and northern boundaries of his property.

In the original plaint, the northern boundary of plaint item No. 1 was incorrectly described as the defendant’s property.

The defendant’s written statement, filed in 2013, specifically contended that the suit had been filed without clear knowledge of the property boundaries.

After commencement of trial, during the petitioner’s cross-examination, the discrepancy in the boundary description was noticed.

The petitioner thereafter filed I.A. No. 16 of 2023 seeking amendment of the plaint, contending that the error resulted from an incorrect translation of the property description from Malayalam into English and that the amendment would bring the plaint in conformity with his title deed.

The Munsiff Court dismissed the amendment application by order dated 29 June 2024, holding that the petitioner had failed to establish the “due diligence” required under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”).

The petitioner challenged that order before the High Court.

Whether the petitioner established that, despite exercising due diligence, he could not have sought amendment of the plaint before commencement of trial, as required by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC?

Whether an amendment correcting the description of the property boundaries should nevertheless be permitted because it was necessary for effective adjudication and would not prejudice the defendant?

The Court applied Order VI Rule 17 CPC, including its proviso, which restricts amendment of pleadings after commencement of trial unless the court is satisfied that, despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter earlier.

“Due diligence” means reasonable diligence, namely, the diligence that a prudent person would exercise in conducting his affairs; delay, laches, and the party’s constructive knowledge are relevant considerations, and the burden lies on the applicant seeking post-trial-commencement amendment.

The Court relied on Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, Vidyabai v. Padmalatha, Samuel J. v. Gattu Mahesh, and M. Revanna v. Anjanamma for these principles.

Although LIC v. Sanjeev Builders (P) Ltd. states that amendments necessary for determining the real controversy should ordinarily be allowed, the Court held that those general principles cannot override the specific statutory restriction contained in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 when trial has commenced.

The Court also considered Basavaraj v. Indira, which held that mere oversight or negligence does not satisfy the due-diligence requirement.

The Court accepted that correcting the boundary description could assist in the proper adjudication of the boundary-fixation suit and that the amendment might not independently cause substantial prejudice to the defendant.

However, because the amendment was sought after commencement of trial, the petitioner first had to satisfy the statutory due-diligence requirement.

The alleged error was not a newly arising fact: the incorrect northern boundary appeared in the original plaint, and the defendant’s Malayalam written statement filed in 2013 had already pointed out the uncertainty regarding the plaintiff’s boundaries.

Consequently, the petitioner and his counsel could, with reasonable diligence, have detected and corrected the mistake well before trial commenced.

The petitioner’s lack of familiarity with English and reliance on counsel’s translation did not establish due diligence, particularly because the written statement was in Malayalam and had drawn attention to the boundary discrepancy.

The Court therefore held that the mistake amounted to oversight or negligence, not an inability to raise the matter earlier despite due diligence.

Since the petitioner failed to demonstrate due diligence and the trial court had correctly dismissed I.A. No. 16 of 2023, the High Court declined to interfere with the impugned order.

The original petition was accordingly dismissed.