Preventive detention based on isolated prohibition offences does not constitute a threat to maintenance of public order.

The petitioner filed a Special Criminal Application apprehending detention under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA Act).

The apprehension stemmed from an FIR registered on December 10, 2024, at Sardarnagar Police Station for offenses under Sections 65(a), 65(e), 81, and 116(b) of the Prohibition Act.

On February 27, 2025, the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad City, passed a detention order (No. PCB/DTN/PASA/98/2025) labeling the petitioner a "bootleget".

The petitioner had already been granted regular bail by the concerned court for the underlying prohibition offenses.

1. Whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of powers under the PASA Act, 1985, is sustainable in law when based on a single criminal case for which bail was already granted.

2. Whether the activities of the petitioner could be classified as "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" as defined under Section 3 of the Act.

The court primarily applied Section 2(b) of the PASA Act, 1985, defining a "bootlegger".

The court applied Section 3 of the PASA Act regarding the maintenance of "public order."

It relied heavily on the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which establishes that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly and as an exception to Article 21 of the Constitution.

Citing Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana and Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, the rule was reinforced that if ordinary criminal law (such as cancellation of bail) provides sufficient means to address apprehensions, extraordinary measures like preventive detention should not be resorted to merely to "clip the wings" of an accused.

The Court determined that the Detaining Authority failed to prove how the petitioner’s alleged activities as a "bootlegger" specifically disturbed "public order" or "public tranquility" as opposed to merely violating "law and order".

The bench observed that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the authority was based on a single case, which did not sufficiently demonstrate a threat to the public at large.

Critically, the Court noted that the petitioner was already on bail; the State should have moved for cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal procedure if they perceived a continuing threat, rather than invoking the PASA Act.

Consequently, the court found the detention order was passed mechanically and without proper application of mind regarding the threshold of "public order".

The Court held that the material on record was insufficient to justify that the petitioner’s activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, rendering the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority illegal and invalid.

Rule was made absolute.