Preventive detention cannot be based on ordinary criminal cases where bail was granted and public order remains unaffected.

The petitioner, Vijaybhai Sureshbhai Patni, was detained as a "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA), pursuant to an order dated 31.01.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad

The grounds for detention were based on two criminal cases registered at Naroda Police Station between November 2024 and December 2025 involving various sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and the Gujarat Police Act

The detenue had been granted bail by the concerned court in both cases prior to the detention order

The petitioner challenged the legality of this preventive detention, arguing it was passed mechanically without evidence that his actions disturbed "public order"

1. Whether the activities of the detenue, based on the registered criminal cases, can be classified as prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order" under the PASA Act

2. Whether the Detaining Authority properly exercised its power of preventive detention when ordinary criminal law (such as cancellation of bail) was available

The court applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits or abets specified offences under the IPC (now BNS) and Arms Act

It strictly followed the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others (AIR 2025 SC 2868) and Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, which established that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly and only when ordinary law is insufficient

Furthermore, it relied on Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana, holding that if a person is enlarged on bail, the State should seek cancellation of bail rather than resorting to preventive detention unless public order is squarely at risk

The Court examined the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority and found it legally flawed.

It reasoned that the mere involvement in two criminal cases does not automatically equate to a disturbance of "public order" as opposed to a mere "law and order" issue

The Court noted that the detenue had already been granted bail by a competent court; therefore, the State should have moved for the cancellation of that bail if they perceived a threat, rather than using the "hard law" of preventive detention to "clip the wings" of the accused

The bench concluded that there was no material evidence on record to show that the petitioner's activities had a bearing on public tranquility or public health that would warrant bypassing ordinary criminal procedure

The court held that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the authority was not in accordance with the law as the activities did not adversely affect the maintenance of public order

The Court directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case, and made the Rule absolute