Preventive detention cannot be invoked for solitary bootlegging offences without material evidence of prejudice to public order.

The petitioner, Akilbhai Firozbhai Sida, was detained under an order dated 09.01.2026 passed by the District Magistrate, Morbi, pursuant to Section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act (PASA), 1985

The grounds for detention relied upon a single criminal case registered against the petitioner on 01.08.2025 under various sections of the Prohibition Act at Tankara Police Station

The petitioner had already been granted regular bail in that case by the competent court

At the time of the hearing, the petitioner was held in Central Jail, Surat

1. Whether the activities of the petitioner, based on a single "bootlegging" case, reached the threshold of being "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" under the Act of 1985

2. Whether the Detaining Authority properly exercised its power of preventive detention when ordinary criminal law (such as cancellation of bail) was available

The court primarily applied Section 3 of the PASA Act, 1985, which allows for detention only if activities are prejudicial to "public order," and Section 2(b) defining a "bootlegger"

It relied on the constitutional principle from *Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu* that preventive detention is an exception to Article 21 and must be used only in rare cases

Furthermore, it applied the doctrine from *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala* (AIR 2025 SC 2868) and *Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar*, establishing that the law of preventive detention should not be used to "clip the wings" of an accused where ordinary criminal law—specifically moving for cancellation of bail—provides sufficient remedy

The court found that the Detaining Authority failed to establish a nexus between the petitioner’s alleged bootlegging activities and a breach of "public order" as opposed to a mere "law and order" issue

The court reasoned that since the petitioner was already granted bail by a competent court, the state should have moved for cancellation of that bail if they feared further offenses, rather than resorting to the "extraordinary power" of preventive detention

The bench determined that the authority’s subjective satisfaction was flawed because a single case under the Prohibition Act does not inherently demonstrate a disturbance to public tranquility or health sufficient to justify the curtailment of personal liberty under the PASA Act

The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the detention order dated 09.01.2026

The court directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case

Rule was made absolute