Preventive detention cannot be invoked for solitary bootlegging offences without material evidence of public order disturbance.

The petitioner was detained by an order dated 23/01/2026 passed by the Police Commissioner, Surat, under Section 2(b) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 ("PASA Act") as a "bootlegger".

The grounds for detention relied upon a single First Information Report (FIR) registered on 05/01/2025 involving the Prohibition Act, BNS, 2023, and the Motor Vehicles Act, in which the petitioner had already been granted regular bail.

The petitioner challenged the detention order via his wife, arguing it was passed mechanically without evidence that his activities disturbed public order.

Whether the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was validly reached regarding the necessity of detention to maintain "public order" under the PASA Act.

Whether a single criminal case, where bail was granted, provides sufficient material to justify preventive detention as an exception to personal liberty.

The court primarily applied Section 2(b) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "bootlegger".

It relied upon the constitutional protections under Article 21 and the limitations on preventive detention defined in *Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu*, emphasizing that such power is an extraordinary exception.

Furthermore, it applied the principles from *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala* (2025) and *Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana*, which hold that ordinary criminal law (such as cancellation of bail) should be exhausted before resorting to preventive detention, and that a distinction must be maintained between "law and order" and "public order".

The court reasoned that the Detaining Authority failed to establish a nexus between the petitioner's alleged bootlegging activities and a genuine threat to "public order," as opposed to mere "law and order" issues.

The court noted that the authority relied on only one registered case, and the petitioner had already been granted bail by a competent court; the State had not moved for the cancellation of said bail, which is the appropriate remedy under ordinary criminal law.

Citing *Dhanya M.*, the court observed that preventive detention should not be used "merely to clip the wings of an accused" when ordinary law suffices.

Consequently, the court found that the subjective satisfaction of the authority was reached without sufficient material to prove the activities were "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order".

The court allowed the petition and quashed the impugned order dated 23/01/2026.

It directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith unless required in any other case, making the Rule absolute.