Probation benefit extendable to non-public servants convicted of conspiracy to commit Prevention of Corruption Act offenses.

The case involves banking frauds committed between 1972 and 1975 by three firms: M/s Guru Prasad Ram Prasad, M/s MT and Company, and M/s MT Agencies

The prosecution alleged that the partners and managers of these firms conspired with State Bank of India officials to make cheques disappear or to forge/interpolate them when accounts lacked sufficient funds

On July 30, 1998, the Special Judge, Anti Corruption (West), Lucknow, convicted five appellants for criminal conspiracy (Section 120-B IPC) to commit offences under Section 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption (PC) Act, 1947

They were sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 4,00,000

During the pendency of the appeal, three appellants died, leaving only Appellant No. 3 (Onkar Nath Mehrotra, aged 90) and Appellant No. 5 (Smt. Neera Mehrotra, aged 88)

The surviving appellants did not challenge the conviction but requested the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, which empowers courts to release offenders on probation for good conduct in cases not punishable by death or life imprisonment

Section 18 of the same Act, which excludes the benefit of probation for substantive offences under Section 5(2) of the PC Act, 1947

The court relied on Lakhvir Singh v. State of Punjab (2021) and Tarak Nath Keshari v. State of W.B. (2024), which establish that probation can be extended in fit cases despite the passage of time or the nature of the offence

The court further invoked the principles from Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar (2024) and Chellammal v. State (2025), emphasizing that sentencing must be reformative and that judges have a mandatory duty to consider probation under Section 360 CrPC and the Probation of Offenders Act

The court observed that the appellants were convicted of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC, rather than the substantive offences under the PC Act

Since the appellants were not public servants and could not be held guilty of the substantive PC Act charges, the court held that the statutory bar in Section 18 of the Probation Act did not apply

In applying the "Rule of Law" to the "Facts," the court noted that the surviving appellants are 90 and 88 years old, suffering from age-related ailments, and the offence dates back over half a century

Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the court reasoned that sentencing must include reformative elements and that placing octogenarians and nonagenarians in custody after such a delay would serve no preventive or deterrent purpose

The court found that since the appellants had no previous criminal history and had remained on bail for decades without further incident, they were ideal candidates for probation

It granted them the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, and ruled that given the lapse of nearly forty years since the original sentence without any subsequent offences, there was no necessity to place them under active supervision or a further probation period

The appeal was disposed of accordingly, effectively waiving the requirement for incarceration and the recovery of fine