Procedural Irregularity in Property Declaration Does Not Constitute a Criminal Offence Under Wildlife Protection Laws

On October 11, 2002, Forest Authorities searched the respondent’s general store in Sagar and seized unauthorized forest produce, including sandalwood, gum, and two Sambhar horns.

The respondent was charged under Sections 5, 11, 13, and 16 of the M.P. Vanopaj (Vyapar-Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969, and Sections 39, 44, and 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.

While the Trial Court initially convicted the respondent, the II Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar, acquitted him on November 23, 2015, finding that the business was lawful and the horns were purchased in 1968 (prior to the 1972 Act) with subsequent intimation to authorities in 1999.

The State filed this petition seeking leave to appeal against the acquittal.

1. Whether the appellate court erred in law by acquitting the respondent despite the alleged unauthorized possession of wildlife articles without a statutory declaration or ownership certificate.

2. Whether interference is warranted against an order of acquittal when a plausible and reasonable view has been taken by the lower court.

The Court applied Section 378(III) of the CrPC regarding leave to appeal against acquittal.

It relied on the principle established in Tota Singh vs. State of Punjab (1987) 2 SCC 529, which mandates that if two views are possible, the one favorable to the accused and taken by the trial/appellate court should not be interfered with.

Substantively, it examined Sections 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, and 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, regarding the possession, declaration, and punishment for wildlife articles, alongside Section 16 of the M.P. Forest Produce Trade Regulation Act, 1969.

The Court reasoned that interference with an acquittal is only justified if the findings are perverse, manifestly illegal, or wholly unjustified.

In analyzing the evidence, the Court noted that the Sambhar horns were purchased in 1968—before the enactment of the Wild Life (Protection) Act—and the respondent had proactively informed the authorities of their possession in 1999.

The Court determined that the failure to provide further information following the death of the respondent's father was merely a "procedural irregularity" rather than a criminal offence.

Since the respondent had already been acquitted of charges under the M.P. Forest Produce Trade Regulation Act, the Court held that the wildlife charges could not stand as the prosecution failed to prove a violation of Sections 39, 40, 42, or 43.

The Court concluded the appellate court’s view was a "possible and reasonable view".

The Court declined to interfere with the acquittal, affirming that since two views were possible, the one favoring the accused must prevail.

Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.