Procedural orders rejecting documents are not interim awards unless they finally adjudicate substantive disputes.

The Petitioner filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking to set aside an order dated 26.11.2024, characterized by the Petitioner as an "Interim Award".

During the arbitral proceedings, the Tribunal refused to take two documents (Ex. C-93 and Ex. C-94) on record.

The Tribunal reasoned that Ex. C-93 was a new document created after the completion of admission/denial, and Ex. C-94 was a contract-specific recommendation rather than a general policy circular.

The Petitioner contended that by refusing these documents, the Tribunal entered into the merits of the claims, specifically regarding the formula for prolongation costs, thereby rendering the order an "Interim Award".

The court primarily applied Sections 2(1)(c), 31(6), and 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

It relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in IFFCO Ltd. v. Bhadra Products, which clarifies that an interim award must conclusively determine "any matter" or point of dispute between the parties.

Furthermore, the court adopted the "governing test" established in H.S. Nag and Ors v. Asian Hotel (North) Ltd, which stipulates that for an order to be an interim award, it must: (a) finally adjudicate a substantive dispute or claim; (b) attain finality/binding effect on that issue; and (c) render the Tribunal functus officio regarding that specific issue.

The Court examined the impugned order against the three-pronged test formulated in H.S. Nag.

It noted that an interim award requires "finality" and "substantive issue determination," whereas a procedural order merely regulates the conduct of proceedings.

The Court observed that the Tribunal's decision to exclude Ex. C-93 and Ex. C-94 was based on procedural timelines (post-admission/denial) and the nature of the evidence (contract-specific vs. general policy).

The Court found that these reasons did not constitute a final adjudication of the Petitioner's substantive claims for prolongation costs or entitlement.

Because the Tribunal had not rendered itself functus officio regarding the underlying claims and the order merely preserved the status of the pleadings, it failed to transcend the realm of a procedural order into an "Interim Award".

Consequently, the petition under Section 34 was held to be non-maintainable.

The Court dismissed the petition along with all pending applications.