Rent Controller must independently verify Section 14(1)(e) ingredients despite failure to seek leave to defend.

The Respondent-landlord instituted an eviction petition under Sections 14(1)(e) and 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, concerning Almirah Shop No. 4866-A, Ward No. III, Ganesh Bazar, Cloth Bazar, Fatehpuri, Delhi.

The Petitioner-tenant filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing an application for leave to defend.

The Additional Rent Controller dismissed the condonation application, noting that the tenant had admittedly failed to file the leave-to-defend application within the prescribed period, and consequently passed an eviction order.

The tenant did not challenge the dismissal of the condonation application in revision.

The landlord claimed that he required the tenanted premises to be demolished so as to widen the passage and facilitate use of his adjoining shop, No. 4866.

Whether the Rent Controller was required to independently examine whether the ingredients of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act were satisfied, notwithstanding the tenant’s failure to file an application for leave to defend within the prescribed period?

Whether the Rent Controller had failed to undertake the requisite examination of the landlord’s bona fide requirement, warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act?

Whether the High Court, in revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8), could reappreciate the material or substitute its own view for that of the Rent Controller merely because another conclusion was possible?

The Court applied Sections 25-B(4) and 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Under Section 25-B(4), where a duly served tenant fails to obtain leave to defend, the statements in the eviction petition are deemed to be admitted and the landlord becomes entitled to an eviction order on the pleaded ground; however, this does not dispense with the Rent Controller’s duty to satisfy itself that the statutory ingredients of the relevant eviction ground are fulfilled.

Section 25-B(8) confers a limited supervisory and revisional, not appellate, jurisdiction on the High Court. Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78; Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30; Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati, 2024:DHC:9322; and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285, the Court held that interference is warranted only for a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, an unreasonable conclusion, or an error apparent on the face of the record—not for mere disagreement on appreciation of evidence.

The Court further relied on Ramesh Basandara v. Moti Ram, 2003 SCC OnLine Del 570, for the principle that the Rent Controller must independently satisfy itself that the requirements of Section 14(1)(e) are made out even where leave to defend has not been filed within time.

The principle that the landlord is ordinarily the best judge of his bona fide business requirement was drawn from Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery, AIR 2000 SC 534.

The High Court found that the Additional Rent Controller had not mechanically granted eviction merely because the tenant failed to file leave to defend.

The Controller expressly recognised the duty to examine whether the ingredients of Section 14(1)(e) were satisfied and relied on Ramesh Basandara for that purpose.

The Controller considered the landlord’s registered sale deeds, letter of attornment, site plan, and other documents, and recorded the landlord’s case that the adjoining shop was too narrow to be conveniently used and that the tenanted premises were required to be demolished to create a passage and facilitate business use.

The High Court held that this amounted to the requisite examination of ownership, bona fide requirement, and suitability of the premises.

The tenant’s request for a different appreciation of the material could not be entertained in the limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8), since no jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity, or manifest illegality was demonstrated.

It further held that the scope of revision under Section 25-B(8) did not permit reappreciation of evidence or substitution of the High Court’s view for that of the Rent Controller.

Finding no jurisdictional error or other ground for interference, the High Court dismissed the revision petition and upheld the eviction order concerning Shop No. 4866-A.

The pending applications were also disposed of; execution was subject to the six-month restriction under Section 14(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, as directed by the Rent Controller.