Review jurisdiction cannot reopen factual findings or entertain unsubstantiated new pleas.

The petitioner, an officer of the Border Security Force (“BSF”), challenged his reversion from the post of Assistant Commandant to Inspector/GD.

The underlying writ petition contended that the reversion was contrary to the Office Memorandum dated 24.11.2022, which required the probationer’s performance during the entire probationary period to be considered by the competent Board.

The petitioner particularly relied on an SMPAR for the period 09.07.2023–08.01.2024, whose adverse gradings were communicated to him on 06.01.2025; he argued that his representation against those gradings had not been decided before his reversion.

The writ petition was dismissed on 19.06.2026, inter alia, on the basis that the relevant representations had been rejected and that the petitioner’s reversion could not be interfered with unless the SMPAR gradings were set aside.

In review, the petitioner contended that the Court had proceeded on an erroneous factual premise that his representation against the SMPAR for 09.07.2022–08.01.2023 had been decided by the Additional Director General (Headquarters), BSF, on 08.12.2023.

The petitioner relied on a representation dated 30.08.2023, which had been returned on 10.09.2023 with directions to submit it to the competent authority in accordance with BSF procedures.

The respondents maintained that no representation had been made.

The Court also noted that the petitioner had not placed on record any subsequent representation allegedly submitted pursuant to the letter dated 10.09.2023, nor had he challenged the relevant SMPAR in the present or connected writ petition.

1. Whether the order dated 19.06.2026 contained an error apparent on the face of the record warranting review under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on the ground that the representation against the SMPAR for 09.07.2022–08.01.2023 had not been decided?

2. Whether the petitioner’s alleged non-disposal of the representation against the SMPAR invalidated his reversion from Assistant Commandant to Inspector/GD?

The Court applied Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, under which review is available only on recognised grounds such as discovery of new evidence, an error apparent on the face of the record, or another sufficient reason; review cannot be used to reargue the case or introduce a new factual contention.

The Court also applied the principle that subsequent developments may be considered while deciding a writ petition, particularly where the relevant administrative representation has subsequently been decided.

The underlying dispute was considered in the context of the Office Memorandum dated 24.11.2022 concerning assessment of a probationer’s performance over the entire probationary period.

The authorities cited in the original proceedings—including Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India, State of Haryana v. Dev Raj, Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra, Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar and Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India—were held distinguishable on the facts.

The Court found no ground for review.

Although the petitioner had produced the representation dated 30.08.2023, that representation had been returned with directions to approach the competent authority in accordance with the applicable BSF procedure.

The petitioner was unable to show that he thereafter submitted the representation as required by the letter dated 10.09.2023, and the alleged subsequent representation had not been placed on the record.

The Court further noted its existing finding that the Additional Director General had decided the relevant representation by order dated 08.12.2023, and the petitioner had not demonstrated that this order related to some other SMPAR.

The Court also held that, even assuming that the representation remained undecided, the petitioner could independently have challenged the SMPAR for 09.07.2022–08.01.2023, but had not done so either in the present writ petition or in the connected petition.

The plea raised in review was therefore treated as a new factual contention rather than an apparent error in the original order.

The petitioner failed to prove that a representation submitted pursuant to the letter dated 10.09.2023 remained undecided, while the Court’s finding regarding the order dated 08.12.2023 remained unrebutted.

Accordingly, Review Petition No. 340/2026 was dismissed as devoid of merit, and the earlier order dated 19.06.2026 dismissing the writ petition and upholding the petitioner’s reversion remained undisturbed.