Routine departmental processing does not constitute sufficient cause for condoning the State’s delay.

The State of Chhattisgarh sought leave to appeal against the judgment dated 18 August 2022 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.S.C. (POCSO Act), Ambikapur, in Special Criminal (POCSO) Case No. 58/2018.

Respondent No. 1 had been acquitted of offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376(a)(b) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(E)/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Respondent No. 2 had been acquitted of offences under Sections 363/34 and 366(a)/34 IPC and Sections 16/17 of the POCSO Act.

The State filed the petition with a delay of 324 days and attributed the delay generally to departmental formalities, processing of the proposal by the Law and Legislative Affairs Department, and governmental procedures.

Whether the application for condonation of delay of 324 days in seeking leave to appeal against the order of acquittal disclosed “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908?

Whether routine departmental processing and governmental procedural delays constitute a sufficient and bona fide explanation warranting condonation of delay?

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, under which delay may be condoned only upon proof of “sufficient cause” preventing timely filing.

Relying on Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Court held that governmental departments are not entitled to condonation merely because of bureaucratic procedures or the impersonal nature of governmental machinery; the State must provide a reasonable, specific and acceptable explanation and demonstrate bona fide diligence.

Applying State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932, together with Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, and Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, 2024 INSC 262, the Court reiterated that negligence, inaction, lack of bona fides or absence of diligence cannot constitute sufficient cause, and that delay cannot be condoned as an act of generosity or merely in the name of substantial justice.

The cause preventing filing must arise within the original limitation period; subsequent events cannot retrospectively justify the initial failure to file within time.

The State’s explanation consisted only of a general reference to departmental formalities and the forwarding and processing of a proposal by the Law and Legislative Affairs Department before filing the petition.

The Court found that this sequence lacked particulars identifying what specifically prevented filing within the prescribed period and did not establish reasonable diligence or bona fide efforts.

In light of the principle that the State is subject to the same limitation standards as any other litigant, routine governmental processing could not, without a specific and cogent explanation, amount to sufficient cause for a delay of 324 days.

The Court therefore declined to examine the merits of the proposed appeal and rejected the delay-condonation application at the threshold.

The application for condonation of delay was rejected, and consequently the State’s petition seeking leave to appeal against the acquittal was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.