Sale of specific khasra numbers does not establish partition; co-sharers retain pre-emption rights.

Defendant No. 1, Narain Lal, sold his alleged 1/5th share—measuring 49 kanals 5 marlas—in agricultural land situated at Village Salarpura, Karnal, to the appellant-vendees through a registered sale deed dated 13.03.1992.

The respondents, claiming to be co-sharers in the joint holding, instituted a suit for possession by way of pre-emption, alleging that the actual consideration was ₹2,73,437.50, although ₹9,23,437.50 was recited in the sale deed, and that no notice of the sale had been given to them.

The vendees contested the suit, asserting, inter alia, that the suit was barred by limitation, that the requisite pre-emption amount had not been deposited, that the land had been partitioned in 1989, and that they had incurred ₹23,000 on levelling the land and installing a tubewell.

The trial court decreed the suit, holding that the respondents were co-sharers with a superior right of pre-emption. The first appellate court affirmed the decree on 23.01.1995.

Whether the respondents were co-sharers in the joint holding and consequently possessed a superior right of pre-emption in respect of the sale dated 13.03.1992?

Whether the suit land had been partitioned by metes and bounds before the sale, thereby extinguishing or defeating the respondents’ right of pre-emption?

Whether the concurrent findings of the courts below gave rise to any substantial question of law warranting interference in regular second appeal?

The Court applied the principle that a co-sharer in joint property has a superior right of pre-emption against a sale by another co-sharer, provided the property continues to be joint on the date of sale and on the date of the decree.

A claim that joint property has been partitioned must be established by cogent evidence of partition by metes and bounds; mere possession of specific khasra or killa numbers, or a sale deed describing particular khasra numbers, does not by itself prove partition or alter the rights of the other co-sharers.

A co-sharer cannot unilaterally sell a specific portion of joint land so as to bind the other co-sharers; such a transaction is treated as a sale of the vendor’s share, subject to the rights arising from joint ownership.

The Court further applied the second-appellate principle that concurrent findings of fact should not be disturbed in the absence of a substantial question of law.

The Court found that the respondents were co-sharers on both the date of sale and the date of the decree, giving them a superior right of pre-emption.

The vendees relied principally on oral assertions that the land had been partitioned in 1989 and that the respondents knew of the sale. However, they produced no reliable evidence proving the date, terms, or completion of any partition, nor any notice or circumstances establishing prior knowledge of the sale.

The jamabandi for 1986–87 continued to show the land as joint, while no subsequent revenue record evidencing partition was produced.

The recital in the sale deed concerning specific khasra numbers and delivery of possession was insufficient, because exclusive possession of a particular portion of joint land may merely reflect an arrangement for management and does not amount to legal partition by metes and bounds.

Consequently, the sale was treated as a sale of the vendor’s share in joint property, which remained subject to the respondents’ right of pre-emption.

The alleged 1989 partition was not proved, and the sale of specific khasra numbers and delivery of possession did not establish partition by metes and bounds.

Finding no substantial question of law and no ground to interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below, the Court dismissed the regular second appeal and upheld the decree for pre-emption.

Any pending applications were disposed of accordingly.