Section 24(2) cannot revive stale acquisition challenges once possession has been taken.

The petitioner challenged the acquisition of land comprised in Village Kadipur, Tehsil and District Gurgaon, through the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 8 March 1989, the declaration under Section 6 dated 7 March 1990, and the award dated 5 March 1992.

The land had originally been jointly purchased by the petitioner’s grandmother, father and another co-purchaser, and was subsequently inherited by the petitioner.

The petitioner claimed that he remained in physical possession and had not received compensation, relying on revenue entries and contending that the acquisition had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

The State submitted that possession had been taken through Rapat Roznamcha No. 306 dated 5 March 1992, that the total compensation had been tendered, that part had been disbursed to the landowners, and that the balance had been deposited before the competent court for disbursement.

The challenge was brought approximately 34 years after the award.

Whether the petitioner’s challenge to the acquisition proceedings was liable to be rejected on the ground of delay, laches and acquiescence, having been filed approximately 34 years after the award?

Whether the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 because the petitioner claimed that compensation had not been paid and that he remained in possession?

Whether the petitioner’s continued physical possession and revenue entries showing changes in ownership could negate the State’s claimed taking of possession and vesting of the land?

The Court applied the doctrine of delay, laches and acquiescence, holding that stale challenges to land-acquisition notifications cannot ordinarily be entertained, particularly where public interest and completed acquisition proceedings are involved, as explained in Desraj v. State of Haryana, 2022 (4) RCR (Civil) 298.

It relied principally on the Constitution Bench decision in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129, which held that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act requires failure both to take possession and to pay compensation; possession having been taken, non-payment alone does not result in lapse.

The decision further holds that drawing a possession memorandum, panchnama or Rapat Roznamcha is a valid mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act, after which the land vests in the State under Section 16 and cannot be divested under Section 24(2).

Tender of compensation under Section 31(1) completes the obligation to pay for purposes of Section 24(2), and deposit in the treasury rather than in court does not invalidate the acquisition.

The Court found that the Section 4 notification, Section 6 declaration and award were issued in 1989, 1990 and 1992 respectively, whereas the writ petition was filed only after approximately 34 years.

Applying Desraj, the Court held that the petitioner could not revive a stale challenge after permitting the acquisition process to attain finality; delay and acquiescence were independently sufficient to defeat the petition.

On the merits of lapse, the Court accepted the respondents’ case that possession had been taken through Rapat Roznamcha No. 306 dated 5 March 1992.

Under Indore Development Authority, this was sufficient to establish possession and vesting, even if the petitioner subsequently remained in physical occupation.

The Court further held that the petitioner’s alleged non-receipt of compensation did not cause lapse because compensation had been tendered, part had been disbursed, and the remaining amount had been placed before the competent court for disbursement.

Continued possession was therefore treated as unlawful after vesting, and the changes in the revenue record did not override the completed acquisition.

The State’s taking of possession through the Rapat Roznamcha resulted in vesting, and the petitioner’s continued possession and revenue entries conferred no legal benefit upon him.

The petitioner was, however, granted liberty to institute appropriate proceedings concerning his claim for payment or disbursement of compensation.