Section 319 Summoning Based Entirely on Hearsay Evidence and Extraneous Materials Is Actuated by Malafide and Is Legally Impermissible

The petitioner challenged an order dated 22.08.2019 passed by the A.D.J.-7, Bhagalpur, summoning him to face trial under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. for offences under Section 302/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act

The prosecution alleged that in June 2012, two unknown persons shot and killed Bishwanath Kumar Gupta

The petitioner was not named in the FIR; his name surfaced three months later through alleged forced confessions of co-accused persons

The petitioner alleged extreme malafides, claiming that a former SSP with personal disputes orchestrated his implication

Notably, the Investigating Officer was penalized by the NHRC for a biased probe

the judicial officer who passed the summoning order was subsequently punished in disciplinary proceedings by the High Court for alleged corruption related to this specific case

During the trial, out of eleven witnesses, ten did not implicate the petitioner, and P.W.-11 (mother of the deceased) claimed the petitioner paid a hitman based solely on newspaper reports

1. Whether the statement of P.W.-11, based on newspaper reports, and the statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. constitute "evidence" sufficient to summon a person under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

2. Whether the impugned summoning order was vitiated by malafides and procedural impropriety

The Court primarily applied Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. regarding the power to proceed against persons appearing to be guilty of an offence

Constitution Bench judgment in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014), which established that "evidence" for Section 319 refers to oral or documentary evidence brought before the court during trial, and that the degree of satisfaction required is more than a prima facie case (as at the framing of charge) but less than satisfaction required for conviction

The principle that Section 164 statements are not substantive evidence and can only be used for corroboration or contradiction

principles in Juhru v. Karim (2023) and Sarojben Ashwinkumar Shah v. State of Gujarat (2011) to emphasize that the power is discretionary, extraordinary, and must be used sparingly

The Court observed that the trial judge committed a "complete illegality" by relying extensively on statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. as substantive evidence to summon the petitioner

Under the Hardeep Singh mandate, Section 319 can only be triggered by evidence produced on oath during the trial itself

The only "evidence" was the testimony of P.W.-11, who alleged the petitioner's involvement but admitted in cross-examination that her knowledge was derived entirely from newspaper reports

The Court reasoned that such hearsay material does not even meet the threshold for framing a charge, let alone the higher standard of satisfaction required for Section 319

the entire history of the case—including the penalization of the Investigating Officer and the disciplinary action against the trial judge for corruption in this very matter—demonstrated that the action was "attended and actuated by malafide" at multiple levels

The Court held that a witness's statement based on newspaper reports does not constitute "strong and cogent evidence"

The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the order dated 22.08.2019