Section 407 transfer requires a present, objective, and well-substantiated apprehension of an unfair trial.

The petitioner-complainant sought transfer under Section 407 read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. of the trial arising from FIR No. 151 dated 12 October 2014, Police Station Sarhali, District Tarn Taran, registered under Sections 302, 148, 149 and 120-B IPC, alleging the murder of his son, Gurjant Singh, by an armed group.

After the initial investigation and earlier trial proceedings, the High Court, by order dated 6 December 2019, directed reinvestigation after noticing serious deficiencies in the investigation, prosecution and conduct of the earlier trial.

Reinvestigation was conducted and a supplementary report under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. was submitted. Three accused—Gurdev Singh, Stalanjit Singh and Gurcharan Singh—had already been acquitted in the earlier trial.

The trial Court subsequently declined the complainant’s request to summon those acquitted persons afresh, holding that the acquittal remained in force and that no direction for their retrial had been issued.

The petitioner alleged that the prosecution and trial Court continued to act unfairly, particularly in relation to the proposed examination of witness Satnam Singh, and therefore sought transfer of the trial outside District Tarn Taran.

The private respondents opposed the petition, also pointing out that the petitioner had himself appeared as PW-1 in the earlier trial and had substantially exonerated several accused, a fact not disclosed in the transfer petition.

Whether the petitioner established a present, genuine and objectively reasonable apprehension that he would not receive a fair and impartial trial before the Court at Tarn Taran, warranting transfer under Section 407 Cr.P.C.

Whether the earlier deficiencies that led to the High Court’s direction for reinvestigation, together with the subsequent orders and conduct complained of by the petitioner, justified transfer of the entire trial outside District Tarn Taran.

Whether the trial Court’s decision concerning the previously acquitted accused and the examination of witness Satnam Singh demonstrated bias or incapacity to conduct a fair trial.

Section 407 Cr.P.C. confers an extraordinary power of transfer to secure the ends of justice, while Section 482 Cr.P.C. preserves the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court; the power must be exercised sparingly and only where a well-substantiated and objectively reasonable apprehension exists that justice will not be administered impartially, objectively and without bias.

In Himanshu Singh Sabharwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2008 (3) SCC 602, the Supreme Court held that a fair trial protects not only the accused but also the victim and society, and requires an impartial Judge, a fair prosecutor and an atmosphere free from witness intimidation or coercion.

In Nahar Singh Yadav v. Union of India, (2011) 1 SCC 307, the Supreme Court cautioned that a mere apprehension is insufficient and identified circumstances such as State or prosecutorial collusion, witness intimidation, an atmosphere hostile to a fair trial, or interference with the administration of justice as relevant grounds for transfer.

An adverse or allegedly erroneous interlocutory order does not, by itself, establish judicial bias or justify transfer of the entire trial.

The Court accepted that the earlier proceedings had involved serious deficiencies and had legitimately resulted in an order for reinvestigation; however, those past circumstances could not operate as a perpetual ground for transfer after reinvestigation had been completed and the supplementary report had been placed before the trial Court.

The trial Court’s refusal to summon persons already acquitted was treated as an adjudicatory decision based on the subsisting acquittal and the absence of a direction for retrial, not as evidence of present bias; its correctness on merits was not to be examined in a transfer petition.

Likewise, the petitioner’s objection to the examination of Satnam Singh—on the ground that the witness had sided with the accused—did not establish unfairness, particularly because the petitioner himself had sought to prevent that witness from entering the witness-box.

The Public Prosecutor’s intention to examine the witness was not, without more, evidence of collusion, and the witness’s testimony could be evaluated by the trial Court in accordance with law.

The petitioner’s failure to disclose his own earlier deposition as PW-1, in which he substantially exonerated several accused, further weakened the bona fides and objective reasonableness of the apprehension projected by him.

In the absence of specific subsequent conduct showing bias, denial of opportunity, witness intimidation or inability of the trial Court to act impartially, the statutory threshold for transfer was not met.

The Court also considered that the FIR dated back to 2014 and that transfer would cause further delay.

The earlier deficiencies that prompted reinvestigation, the trial Court’s order concerning acquitted accused, and the proposed examination of Satnam Singh did not justify exercise of the extraordinary transfer jurisdiction under Section 407 Cr.P.C.

The petition was accordingly dismissed.

The Court clarified that its observations were confined to the question of transfer and did not express any opinion on the merits of the criminal case or the evidentiary value of the witnesses’ statements.