Section 57 externment necessitates post-conviction similar offences and recorded subjective satisfaction for the maximum duration.

The Petitioner challenged the externment order dated 16.10.2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Respondent No. 2) and the appellate order dated 22.12.2025 passed by the Divisional Commissioner (Respondent No. 1)

Proceedings were initiated under Section 57 of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951, based on the Petitioner's prior conviction under Section 307 of the IPC in 2019

Following this conviction, two more crimes were registered: Crime No. 754 of 2024 (under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita) and Crime No. 124 of 2025 (under the NDPS Act)

Respondent No. 2 externed the Petitioner from Nagpur District for the maximum permissible period of two years

The Court applied Section 57 of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951, which empowers authorities to remove previously convicted persons if there is reason to believe they will engage in "similar offences"

Section 57 specifically requires a conviction followed by the commission of a similar offence

The Court further relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Deepak s/o Laxman Dongre vs. State of Maharashtra, which mandates that an order for the maximum externment period (two years under Section 58) must disclose subjective satisfaction and application of mind regarding the necessity of that specific duration

The Court found that Respondent No. 2 failed to distinguish between the requirements of Sections 56 and 57 of the Act.

While Section 57 is restricted to post-conviction conduct of a similar nature, the authority improperly considered the "impact on society" and the Petitioner’s entire criminal history, which are parameters under Section 56

The Court observed that Crime No. 754/2024 was a dispute of "individual character" involving a relative and did not reflect a broader threat to society, a fact the authority failed to subjectively assess

Crucially, the Court held that the impugned order lacked any justification or reasoning for imposing the maximum externment period of two years.

Without recorded satisfaction on why the maximum period was necessary, the order constituted an unreasonable restriction on the Petitioner's fundamental right to move freely under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution

The Court held that an externment order under Section 57 is invalid if it relies on extraneous considerations meant for Section 56 and fails to provide specific material or reasoning to justify the maximum duration of two years

Rule was made absolute