Service disputes involving non-teaching staff at unaided private schools are not writ-maintainable absent a public-law element.

The petitioners, employed in non-teaching administrative roles at the respondent unaided private school, challenged orders dated 9 January 2016 terminating their services.

They alleged that their employment was terminated without notice or proper enquiry, following allegations of deficient performance and financial loss.

They sought quashing of the termination orders and reinstatement with consequential benefits.

The school objected that the petitions concerned contractual employment and were not maintainable under Article 226.

The Court considered maintainability without examining the merits of the termination.

1. Whether writ petitions under Article 226 are maintainable to challenge the termination of non-teaching employees by an unaided private school, where the dispute arises from their employment.

2. Whether the school’s role in imparting education, including its obligations under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, makes this service dispute amenable to writ jurisdiction.

Article 226 provides a public-law remedy against a person or body discharging public duties or functions, but the challenged action must itself have a public-law element; an ordinary contractual service dispute is not, without more, amenable to writ review.

Under St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava (2023) 4 SCC 498, an educational institution’s performance of a public duty does not make every employment decision reviewable under Article 226; service matters of employees not governed by statutory provisions generally remain within the private contractual realm.

The Court also relied on Army Welfare Educational Society v. Sunilkumar Sharma, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1683, and the Madras High Court Division Bench decision in W.A. No. 2887 of 2023.

The Court noted that the petitioners’ reliance on the RTE Act, 2009 did not establish a public-law issue because their grievance was not about enforcement of that Act.

The petitioners challenged termination of their employment, rather than any failure by the school to discharge an educational or statutory duty.

Although imparting education may constitute a public duty, the termination of non-teaching staff was an employment matter and had no demonstrated direct nexus to the discharge of that duty.

The Court found no applicable statutory regulation of the petitioners’ service conditions or government role in their termination.

Applying St. Mary’s Education Society and Army Welfare Educational Society, it held that the dispute remained contractual and private; the RTE Act argument did not alter that character.

Both petitions were dismissed without consideration of the merits, with liberty to the petitioners to approach the competent forum for relief.