Show-Cause Notice Reflecting Prejudiced Mind and Functioning Under Administrative Dictation Lacks Quasi-Judicial Validity

The petitioner entered into a 21-year lease agreement in 2004 with Murshidabad Zilla Parishad (Respondent No. 2) for a medical center.

The respondent terminated the lease in January 2022 alleging non-payment of rent, subsequent to which the term also expired by efflux of time in July 2025.

Initial civil proceedings and an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act led to the dispute being referred to an Arbitrator.

Parallelly, on July 22, 2025, the Sub Divisional Magistrate (SDM/Collector) initiated eviction proceedings under the West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1962, issuing a show-cause notice.

The petitioner challenged this notice, alleging it was issued with a prejudged mind and under dictation from the District Magistrate.

Section 3 of the West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1962, which governs the issuance of show-cause notices for eviction.

The principles from Siemens Limited v. State of Maharashtra and Oryx Fisheries Private Limited v. Union of India, which establish that a show-cause notice is invalid if it reflects a predetermined mind or if the reply would be a mere "empty ceremony".

The doctrine that quasi-judicial authorities must not act under the dictation of hierarchical superiors, as held in Orient Paper Mills Limited v. Union of India.

Central Warehousing Corporation v. Sidhartha Titles, clarifying that special statutory eviction mechanisms for public land are not eclipsed by private arbitration.

The Court found the impugned notice legally vulnerable because it used language suggesting the Collector was already "satisfied" as to the unauthorized occupation before hearing the petitioner, deviating from the neutral tone required by Rule 3(1) of the 1963 Rules.

Crucially, an internal order dated November 13, 2025, explicitly stated the Collector was proceeding "in compliance with the instruction of the District Magistrate," confirming the authority was not domesticating its own judgment but acting under dictation.

The Court reasoned that since the lease had expired by efflux of time, the 1962 Act provided a distinct public law remedy for recovery of public land that runs parallel to private law arbitral disputes regarding contractual breaches.

The Court granted the respondent authorities liberty to initiate fresh proceedings strictly in accordance with the fair procedure laid down in Oryx Fisheries, clarifying that pending arbitration does not preclude statutory action under the 1962 Act.