Specific allegations under Section 33 preclude quashing; factual defences must be examined at trial.

The petitioners invoked Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of Complaint No. 54 dated 02.09.2020, the summoning order of the same date, and consequential proceedings arising under Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29 and 33 of the Insecticides Act, 1968, read with Rule 27(5) of the Insecticides Rules, 1971.

On 13.06.2019, an Insecticide Inspector inspected the premises of M/s Khushal Agro Chemicals and drew a sample of Cartap Hydrochloride 4 GR Modan, Batch No. MCPCH1815, manufactured by M/s Modesto Crop Protection Pvt. Ltd. The State Insecticide Laboratory found the active ingredient to be 2.93% instead of the prescribed 4%, and the Central Insecticides Laboratory, on re-analysis, found it to be 2.64%; both reports declared the sample misbranded.

Petitioner No. 1, Ram Avtar Garg, was described as a Director and responsible person of the manufacturing company, while petitioner No. 2, Lovish Kansal, was described as its Godown Incharge. The complaint alleged that both had furnished affidavits under Section 33 of the Act and had failed to discharge their duties concerning the misbranded insecticide.

The petitioners contended that another officer, Surinder Singh, had been nominated as the responsible person; that they were not responsible for quality control; that the batch number and source of the sampled product were disputed; that petitioner No. 2 had left the company before sampling; and that the Magistrate had not conducted the inquiry contemplated by Section 202 Cr.P.C. despite the petitioners residing outside the territorial jurisdiction.

The Court applied Section 482 Cr.P.C., under which inherent jurisdiction may be exercised to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice, but not to conduct a mini-trial or determine disputed factual defences.

Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29 and 33 of the Insecticides Act, 1968, read with Rule 27(5) of the Insecticides Rules, 1971, governed the alleged manufacture, sale and prosecution of misbranded insecticides.

Section 33(1) imposes liability on a person who, at the time of the offence, was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business; Section 33(2) extends liability to a Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer where the offence occurred with that person’s consent, connivance or was attributable to that person’s neglect.

Section 202 Cr.P.C. must be read harmoniously with Section 200 Cr.P.C.; according to The State of Kerala and another v. M/s Panacea Biotec Ltd. and another, 2026 INSC 200, a complaint made in writing by a public servant acting in discharge of official duties does not require examination of the complainant and witnesses on oath in the same manner as a private complaint.

The Court held that the complaint contained specific allegations identifying petitioner No. 1 as a Director and responsible person and petitioner No. 2 as the Godown Incharge, and referred to their affidavits under Section 33 and alleged failures in their respective duties.

The nomination of Surinder Singh did not automatically immunise the petitioners, since prosecution of one responsible officer is not a bar to prosecuting another against whom independent allegations are made.

The objections concerning the batch number, source of the product, the dealer’s licence, and petitioner No. 2’s cessation of employment involved disputed documents and factual matters that could only be determined after evidence and could not be adjudicated under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The sampling objection also failed at the threshold because the State alleged that three sealed portions had been prepared and that both the State and Central Laboratories found the sample misbranded.

The absence of a separate Section 202 inquiry was not fatal because the complaint had been instituted by a statutory public servant in the course of official duties, consistent with Panacea Biotec.

Although the summoning order was brief, it was read together with the complaint and accompanying material, which disclosed the test reports and the alleged roles of the petitioners.

Since the record did not demonstrate a complete absence of a prima facie case, quashing was unwarranted.

It held that the complaint and supporting material disclosed a prima facie case under the Insecticides Act, while the petitioners’ objections were matters of factual defence to be examined by the trial Court.

The Court clarified that its observations were confined to the question of quashing and would not prejudice the determination of the petitioners’ guilt or innocence at trial.