Stale claims for possession cannot be entertained under Article 226 due to unexplained delay and laches.

The petitioner responded to a 1991 advertisement by the Town Improvement Trust, Damoh, for a lottery-based plot allotment under the Rashtriya Awas Bank Yojana.

She was allotted Plot MIG No. 33 and deposited a total of ₹44,500.

A lease deed was subsequently executed in her favor on June 24, 1996.

Despite completing all formalities, the respondents failed to deliver possession of the plot for over 27 years.

The petitioner filed the present writ petition on June 19, 2025, seeking a mandamus for delivery of possession and disposal of her representation.

1. Whether a writ petition seeking enforcement of rights under a 1996 lease deed can be entertained after a delay of nearly 29 years without a plausible explanation.

2. Whether the court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favor of a "sleeping litigant".

The court applied the equitable doctrine of "delay and laches," establishing that discretionary relief under Article 226 cannot be granted to those who sleep over their rights.

The court relied on Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan (2006), which held that negligence or omission to assert rights within a reasonable time causes prejudice to the opposite party.

The court cited State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty (2011) to affirm that stale claims cannot be revived by a litigant waking from "deep slumber".

The court cited S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala (2009) to emphasize that "delay defeats equity".

The court observed that the allotment process and lease execution were finalized in 1996, yet the petitioner remained silent for nearly three decades before approaching the High Court in 2025.

The court rejected the petitioner’s assertion that there was no delay, noting the absence of any plausible explanation for the 27-year interval.

The court also found the petitioner's evidence of representation (Annexure P/5) unreliable as it lacked both a date and an acknowledgment.

The court reasoned that the extraordinary jurisdiction of Article 226 is reserved for diligent litigants, and entertaining such a stale claim after 27 years would be contrary to principles of equity and judicial discretion.

The court ruled that the petitioner, being a "sleeping litigant," is not entitled to discretionary relief regardless of the merits of the initial allotment.

The writ petition was dismissed with no order as to costs.