The 1988 Government Resolution applies prospectively to continuously serving daily-wage employees appointed after its issuance.

The petitioner was engaged as a daily-wage employee by the respondents from 1 July 1989 and continued in service, subject to periodic renewals, until his retirement on 29 February 2024.

After his removal from service on 1 June 2004, he raised Reference (LCA) No. 1506 of 2004. The Labour Court directed his reinstatement with 50% back wages by award dated 27 August 2010. The State’s challenge before the High Court, Division Bench, and Supreme Court was unsuccessful, and the petitioner was consequently reinstated with back wages.

The petitioner subsequently sought benefits under the State Government Resolution dated 17 October 1988 (“G.R. dated 17.10.1988”). In an earlier petition, SCA No. 424 of 2024, the High Court directed the respondents to consider his claim.

The respondents rejected the claim on 23 April 2024, principally on the ground that the petitioner had been appointed after the date of the Government Resolution. He therefore filed the present petition challenging that rejection and seeking regularisation, pay-scale and consequential benefits.

Whether the petitioner, appointed as a daily-wage employee on 1 July 1989, could be denied the benefits of the G.R. dated 17.10.1988 solely because his appointment was subsequent to the date of that Resolution.

Whether the respondents’ rejection order dated 23 April 2024 was legally sustainable in light of the petitioner’s continuous service and the grant of similar benefits to a co-employee.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to consequential monetary benefits, interest and costs for the respondents’ failure to extend the benefits under the Government Resolution.

The Court applied the principles embodied in the Government Resolution dated 17.10.1988 concerning benefits for eligible daily-wage employees.

It held that the Resolution was not confined to employees appointed before 17.10.1988 and could have prospective application to employees appointed thereafter, particularly because State agencies continued to engage daily-wage workers after the Resolution.

The Court further applied the principle that similarly situated employees should not be denied benefits on an arbitrary or irrelevant distinction, especially where a co-employee had received benefits under the same Resolution.

The Court also exercised its power under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the erroneous administrative order and grant consequential directions, interest and costs.

The respondents rejected the petitioner’s claim solely because he was appointed on 1 July 1989, after the G.R. dated 17.10.1988.

The Court found this reasoning legally erroneous because the Government Resolution did not exclude all employees appointed after its date; its stipulation against post-Resolution daily-wage appointments could not be used to deny benefits where the State itself continued to engage daily-wage workers thereafter.

The petitioner had served continuously from 1 July 1989 until retirement, and the respondents had not disputed the continuity of his service.

The distinction drawn between the petitioner and a co-employee—who received the benefits merely because that employee had been appointed before 17.10.1988—was therefore insufficient and unsustainable.

The Court also considered the petitioner’s repeated litigation to secure reinstatement and service benefits, and concluded that the respondents had disregarded the settled legal position while passing the rejection order.

Respondent No. 2 was directed to forward a proposal for extending those benefits within four weeks of receiving the judgment, and the competent authority was directed to release the petitioner’s dues within six weeks thereafter.

If the benefits were not granted within ten weeks, the petitioner would be entitled to interest at 6% per annum on the arrears from the date of retirement until disbursement.

The State was further directed to pay costs of ₹15,000 to the petitioner within four weeks.

The connected civil application was disposed of as infructuous.